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Judging Plaintiffs
Jason M. Solomon
60 Vand. L. Rev. 1749 (2007)
With its powerful account of the normative principles
embodied in the structure and practice of the law of torts, corrective
justice is considered the leading moral theory of tort law. It has a
significant advantage over instrumental and other moral theories in
that it is more consistent with what judges say when they analyze
tort law concepts. And with criticism of instrumental accounts, like
law and economics, on a number of fronts, it is the leading
descriptive theory of tort law.
In this Article, I take up a question that has never been
answered adequately by corrective-justice or other moral theorists:
Why do we judge plaintiffs- their conduct, state of mind and other
factors - to determine liability in tort law? This Article attempts to
answer that question, and in doing so, shed light on contemporary
theoretical, doctrinal, and practical debates about tort law.
To do so, I first recast a variety of disparate doctrines in tort
law as instances of a singular phenomenon-''judging-plaintiffs
law''-and argue that existing explanations of this phenomenon fall
short. Next, I suggest that judging-plaintiffs law can be explained
and unified through a principle of self-help. Then, I argue that a
new moral theory of tort law, civil recourse theory, is uniquely well
positioned to explain why plaintiff's capacity for self-help ought to
lead to a judgment of no liability.
Finally, I suggest that my interpretation of judging-plaintiffs
law lends support to a more robust "right of action" concept in civil
recourse theory, and I describe the doctrinal and practical payoff of
such an analytic move. I aim to help move the debate over tort
theory and doctrine forward by placing civil recourse theory at the
center of the discussion.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Through the rhetorical force of a few landmark opinions, Judge
Benjamin Cardozo helped shape modern American tort law. In
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 1 Cardozo led a successful assault on
the "citadel of privity," 2 according to which manufacturers could not be
held liable in tort to those with whom they did not have a contractual
relationship. MacPherson opened the door for the area of law we now
know as products liability and, more broadly, towards an
understanding of tort law known as "enterprise liability" that saw tort
law as a vehicle for identifying the entity best situated to minimize
the costs of accidents and accident prevention, as well as spread the
loss from harm. 3
In Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., Cardozo articulated an
understanding of negligence law built on notions of obligation between
individuals. 4 His idea was that duties of care ought to be understood
relationally, as running from one individual to another, as opposed to
Judge Andrews' dissent, which articulated a duty "to the whole
111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931).
3.
The development is discussed in George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability:
A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461
(1985).
4.
162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
1.
2.
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world." 5 Though scholars criticized Cardozo's opinion for years, recent
scholarship approves of Cardozo's opinion as helping to explain moral
theories of tort law. 6
Along with MacPherson and Palsgraf, another Cardozo opinion
sometimes appears in first-year torts casebooks, though it is less
celebrated. This case, Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.,
involved a man who was injured on a Coney Island amusement park
ride known as "the Flopper." 7 Murphy is taught for its articulation of
"assumption of risk" themes, and it is remembered for Cardozo's
signature rhetorical flourishes that captured his view of Murphy's
quest for compensation. The plaintiff, Cardozo said, was a "vigorous
young man," and the "timorous may stay at home." 8 No tort remedy
for young Murphy.
Unlike MacPherson and Palsgraf, this case is largely ignored in
debates over the purpose of tort law. But the analytic move employed
in Murphy-judging the plaintiff in order to determine liabilityought to be as central to our understanding of the normative structure
and practical operation of tort law as any Cardozo opinion. Or so I will
argue in this Article.
My task here will not be to analyze in great depth the Murphy
case, or even the "assumption of risk" doctrine for which it stands.
This ground has been well covered by other scholars. 9 Rather, I use
Murphy to call our attention to a nagging and important question that
tort theorists never have answered adequately: Why do we judge
plaintiffs-their conduct, choices, and other factors-to determine
liability in tort law? This Article attempts to answer that question
and, in doing so, to shed light on contemporary theoretical, doctrinal,
and practical debates about tort law.
Instances of judging plaintiffs can be seen most clearly in the
form of affirmative defenses like the assumption of risk arguably at
issue in Murphy, but they also come in the form of sometimes puzzling
doctrines that are treated as part of a plaintiffs prima facie case, such
as justifiable reliance in fraud, 10 the public figure doctrine in
5.
Id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
6.
See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 66-67 (1999)
(approvingly discussing the principle found in Palsgraf that an actor's liability in negligence
should be limited to those toward whom the actor is negligent, or wrongs); ERNEST J. WEINRIB,
THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 159-65 (1995) (comparing Cardozo's and Andrews' approaches to the
duty of care, and favoring that of Cardozo, as Andrews' approach "makes manifest his failure to
integrate negligence and injury").
7.
166N.E.173, 173-74(N.Y.1929).
8.
Id. at 174.
9.
See infra Section III.B.1 and accompanying notes.
10. See infra Section III.A.3.
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defamation law, 11 and the reasonableness and contemporaneous
awareness requirements in false imprisonment and assault claims.1 2
Indeed, these judging-plaintiffs cases are pervasive and have long
been a feature of tort law.l 3
The argument proceeds as follows: First, I briefly set out the
competing theoretical frameworks for contemporary American tort
law, which form the backdrop for my argument. 14 Second, I recast a
variety of disparate tort law doctrines as instances of a singular
phenomenon-"judging
plaintiffs"-and
argue
that
existing
1
explanations for this phenomenon fall short. 5 Third, I suggest that
judging-plaintiffs law can be explained and unified through a principle
of self-help.1 6 Fourth, I argue that a new moral theory of tort law, civil
recourse theory, is uniquely well positioned to explain why a plaintiffs
capacity for self-help, either to prevent or remedy the wrong, ought to
lead to a judgment of no liability.1 7 Finally, I suggest that my
interpretation of judging-plaintiffs law has important implications for
the "right of action" concept in civil recourse theory, which has both a
theoretical and a practical payoff for tort law. 18
The Article's methodology entails using a particular dimension
of tort law that is underexplored to critique and build on existing
interpretive theories. If a theory does not account adequately for the
reasoning and outcomes of judging-plaintiffs cases, it is evidence of the

11. See infra Section III.A.4.
12. See infra Sections III.C.1-2.
13. To be sure, to the extent that a descriptive theory of torts includes historical claims
about why tort law is the way it is, there may be no puzzle here. The historian can trace notions
of contributory negligence, for example, back to Roman law, to early English common law after
that, through Blackstone, and on to twentieth century America. Others writing from a more
Marxist perspective, like Morton Horwitz, trace contributory negligence's rise to 19th-century
judges seeking to subsidize the industrial revolution. See NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE
LAW: COMMON LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 8 (1997) (explaining
Horwitz's Marxist approach as the view that "legal systems simply serve as the instruments of
dominant classes"). But to the extent that one wants more than historical claims from a positive
theory of tort law-and, as I explain below, I think we do-one needs further justification of this
social institution.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Section IV.B.
17. See infra Section IV.C.
18. See infra Part V. Following in the footsteps of other torts scholars, I am working on a
satisfying theoretical framework for what tort law is-mostly, I leave whether that is what tort
law ought to be (or even whether tort law is something that ought to exist) for another day. See,
e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Assumption of Risk, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 833, 835-36 (1997) (employing
a "mixed descriptive/prescriptive" approach to analyzing tort law).
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theory's weakness as an interpretive account of tort law.1 9 The kind of
theory at work here is what Jules Coleman calls "middle-level theory:"
looking at the concepts and practices at work in the particular area of
law, and asking whether there are broader principles that can help
explain and justify these practices. 2o

II. TORT LAW'S THEORETICAL MOMENT
At all levels-theoretical, doctrinal, and practical-the
foundations of American tort law stand on shaky ground. Doctrinally,
the Restatement (Third)'s Liability for Physical Harm has recently
been finalized, 21 yet the place of many fundamental concepts within
tort law-duty, proximate cause, and assumption of risk, to name a
few-remains up in the air.
In order to explicate the role of these concepts, one might want
a descriptive account of tort law. What is tort law's purpose? At a more
basic level, what is the institution of tort law?
But consensus is nowhere in sight. Descriptive theories of tort
law belong to one of two categories: instrumental or moral. 22 The
leading exemplars of each approach, law and economics (instrumental)
and corrective justice (moral), have spent much of the past few
decades attacking one another as irrelevant, with both sides at a
standoff. One of the Restatement (Third) drafters, the late Professor
Gary Schwartz of UCLA, tried to break the impasse a decade ago by
proposing a "mixed theory of tort law." 23 His article took the tone that
fellow Angeleno Rodney King had taken a few years earlier in the
midst of widespread rioting: "People, I just want to say, you know, can

19. See Benjamin Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 707
(2003) (explaining "pragmatic conceptualism," based on the approach that "understanding of
legal concepts requires an understanding of the structure of practical inferences in which our
legal concepts and principles are involved").
20. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 8-9 (1992). l take as a given the desirability of a
unifying account for tort law, rather than a pluralist account. Without such a unified account, it
is difficult to prevent granular issues in tort doctrine from dissolving into ad hoc policymaking by
judges, liberated to choose from an unprioritized menu of policy goals depending on political or
other preferences. I recognize that many scholars believe that a unified account is not possible,
and I do not defend the desirability of a unified account at any length here.
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (Proposed Final Draft No.
1, 2005).
22. Deontological (morality-hased) and consequentialist (what I call instrumental) are
alternative denominations for these theoretical camps.
23. Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997).
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we all get along?" 24 But Schwartz's plea met with even less success
than King's.
The doctrinal and theoretical moment is sharpened by the
presence of "tort reform" efforts nationwide, efforts which affect the
day-to-day practice of tort law. These are efforts to change tort law
legislatively, and the purpose of tort law is relevant to these efforts in
two related ways. First, to the extent that the tort reform debates take
place on the merits and are about anything but raw clashes of political
power (an open question), one needs a descriptive theory of tort law to
judge whether a particular change or set of changes will have a
beneficial effect on the functioning of tort law. As one scholar recently
put it, one ought to start tort reform debates with the question: "What
are we reforming?" 25 Second, for those who think tort law has a
legitimate and important function, the coherence of and justification
for tort law impacts its ability to withstand scrutiny.
The judging-plaintiffs cases are a significant subset of the class
of cases that pose the greatest challenge to any explanatory theory of
tort law, namely, cases where the defendant foreseeably has caused
legally cognizable harm to the plaintiff, yet liability is denied. In this
sense, the judging-plaintiffs cases are like the famous Palsgraf case,
where the defendant railroad's employees carelessly dislodged a
package that harmed Mrs. Palsgraf, who was standing at the end of
the platform, yet the railroad was not held liable. 26 Indeed, I argue
that a new moral theory of tort law--civil recourse theory-is uniquely
well positioned to explain judging-plaintiffs law and that judgingplaintiffs law can help illuminate and extend the explanatory power of
recourse theory in a way that its architects have not yet articulated.
The following section provides a brief sketch of the leading
theoretical accounts of tort law to set the stage for consideration of
judging-plaintiffs law and the light it may shed on these theoretical
accounts.

A. Instrumentalism and Its Discontents
Since the publication of Oliver Wendell Holmes' The Common
Law in 1881,2 7 the dominant perspective among scholars is that tort

24.
25.

RALPH KEYES, THE QUOTE VERIFIER: WHO SAID WHAT, WHERE, AND WHEN 22 (2006).
John C.P. Goldberg, What Are We Reforming? Tort Theory's Place in Debates ouer
Malpractice Reform, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1075 (2006).
26. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
27. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (Dover Puhl'ns 1991) (1888).
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law can be justified on instrumental grounds 28-that is, that the social
institution we call tort law is designed to achieve one or more of
several public policy or social goals, including compensating the
injured, deterring or regulating risky activity, achieving an efficient
level of accident prevention, and equitably spreading the loss from
physical harm. 29
We might think about instrumental theories of tort law as
falling into three categories: compensation-deterrence, enterprise
liability, and economic. 3° Compensation-deterrence scholars see tort
law as an institution designed to achieve the goals of compensating
victims and deterring risky activities that might result in harm. 31 This
perspective is ingrained in first-year law students when they are told
that tort law is designed to achieve these twin goals. In difficult cases,
judges are to assess whether a particular result would best serve these
twin goals, both as to the parties before the court and future parties.
This view was dominant for much of the twentieth century, but it has
been undermined by considerable evidence that our system of tort law
neither compensates nor deters particularly well. Another problem is
how to determine when these goals conflict. This leads to one of two
conclusions: either tort law should be eliminated (a view embraced by
many in the late twentieth century) or tort law must be doing
something other than compensating and deterring.
A second instrumental theory, "enterprise Iiability," 32 is based
on the idea that companies that manufacture cars, prescription drugs,
or other consumer products are in the best position to spread the risk
by passing along the cost of injury to consumers and to minimize the

28.

For a discussion of instrumentalism in legal reasoning, see Robert S. Summers,

Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought: A Synthesis and
Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861
(1981).
29. Here, 1 refer to what are variously called "descriptive," "interpretive," or "positive"
theories of tort law-theories that focus on what tort law is, as opposed to normative theories
that focus on what tort law ought to be.
30. See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 521-60 (2003)
(grouping instrumental theories within these categories).
31. Id. at 525 ("And so we arrive at the baseline proposition of compensation-deterrence
theory, repeated at the outset of countless law review articles published in the last fifty years:
The function of tort law is to compensate and deter.").
32. This concept has intellectual founders that include Realists like Fleming James and
Leon Green, and economic theorists like Guido Calabresi. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 3, at 471,
500 (citing James' argument that most defendants are enterprises and thus better positioned
than individual plaintiffs to distribute risks, and Green's 1952 declaration that the fault system
of tort should be replaced with a simple compensation system); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts
on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 514 (1961) (arguing that a
compensation system based on enterprise liability "would enhance proper resource allocation").
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cost of accidents by taking efficient levels of precaution. 33 According to
this view, tort law is best justified as a means of achieving these lossspreading and accident-prevention goals. In the enterprise-liability
narrative, plaintiff-conduct defenses like assumption of risk will fall
away gradually as tort law moves towards principles that treat the
problem of accidents as a systemic one, not one of individual morality
and fault. 34 But this has not happened. Indeed, with products
liability's move away from strict liability principles and the stalled
movement towards no-fault auto insurance, enterprise liability has
lost plausibility as a descriptive theory, as even its proponents
acknowledge.
Under the economic account, the goal of tort law is to maximize
social welfare by minimizing the costs of accidents and accident
prevention. 35 Liability rules can be both explained and evaluated with
reference to this goal. Under this microeconomic perspective, people
and companies are the objects of incentives Oiability rules) which lead
them to increase or decrease their levels of activity depending on how
much they are expected to pay if they cause harm to others. 36 At the
time this economic account emerged, most tort scholars still saw tort
law as a way to provide compensation to the injured and achieve
deterrence of risky activities. The economists, however, provided the
first comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding tort law.
And the economic account provides a coherent account of why we
judge the conduct of plaintiffs-like young Murphy on the Flopper-to
properly incentivize them to take due care.
Besides the important questions raised about how well tort law
achieves these social goals, these instrumental accounts of tort law
have come under attack on a more fundamental level in recent years
and, as a result, stand on shaky foundations as a plausible
justification for tort law. 37 Legal theorists like Jules Coleman and
Ernest Weinrib have argued that the economic account does not
provide the kind of explanation that an interpretive legal theory
33. Goldberg, supra note 30, at 540.
34. Id. at 538-39 (describing the enterprise-liability view that traditional negligence law,
with its plaintiff-conduct defenses, is ill-suited to govern the kinds of inevitable accidents that
dominate the modern industrialized economy).
35. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26
(1970) (taking as "axiomatic" that this is the principal function of accident law); WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 58-62 (1987) (modeling
due care levels to minimize the social costs of accidents).
36. Goldberg, supra note 30, at 544-60.
37. I am referring here to their interpretive as opposed to normative form. For an overall
critique of instrumentalism as a legal theory, see BRIAN z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN
END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW (2006).

2007]

JUDGING PLAINTIFFS

1757

demands. 38 That is, its functional account is too detached from the
actual practices of the law to provide a legitimate interpretation of it.
According to this critique, a legal theory is inadequate if it fails to
account for and discuss the concepts and structure that are actually
employed by the legal actors within that area of law. 39 Because purely
instrumental accounts of tort law, like law and economics, do not
provide analyses of tort law concepts, they are inadequate as
descriptive theories of tort law. 4 o
A version of this "second-order" critique has been around
almost as long as law and economics itself. As one scholar sympathetic
to interpretative economic theory put it, "From its inception, the
economic analysis of the common law has been embarrassed by an
open secret: common law decisions are cast in the language of
morality, not efficiency .... "41 Terms like "duty," "assumption of risk,"
and "reasonable care" are loaded with morality and, on their face,
bereft of utilitarian considerations. If we take seriously H.L.A. Hart's
admonition that legal theory must provide an account of the "internal
point of view" of those that operate within the law, then instrumental
accounts fail to measure up. 42
Corrective justice theorists have articulated a more specific and
structural version of this critique in the tort law context. The economic
account of tort law as a pricing mechanism for risky activity treats
plaintiffs as private attorneys general, induced by a bribe (the promise
of compensatory damages) to help regulate risky activity. 43 But the
account ignores the fundamental "bipolarity'' of tort law, according to
corrective justice theorists: 44 A plaintiff brings a lawsuit against a

38. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 20, at 382 ("[T]he victim's connection to his injurer is
fundamental and analytic, not tenuous and contingent. Thus, even if the current structure of tort
litigation is consistent with economic analysis, it is better understood as embodying some
conception of corrective justice."); WEINRIB, supra note 6, at 132-33 ("[E]conomic analysis makes
the wrong kind of considerations the primary building blocks of its enterprise. At the core of this
treatment lies a straightforward idea: welfare cannot supply the normative underpinning for
private law because private law relationships are bipolar and welfare is not.").
39. Benjamin Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457, 466 (2000).
40. Id.
41. Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A
Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 289 (2007).
42. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 88-90 (2d ed. 1994); see also STEPHEN A. SMITH,
CONTRACT THEORY 15 (2004) ("[T)here has been a general agreement that a central feature ... of
[law's] self-understanding is [its] claim to authority-the claim or belief that law is morally
justified.").
43. WEINRIB, supra note 6, at 15.
44. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort Law, 34 MCGILL L.J. 403, 408
(1989) ("[T)he tort relationship is not a means to an end. Rather, each harm done and suffered is
the core of a single transaction that relates this doer to this sufferer .... ").
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defendant, and the defendant, if proven liable, does not pay a fine to
the state in the amount necessary to deter future parties. Instead, the
defendant pays the plaintiff an amount that is intended to make the
plaintiff "whole." The failure of law and economics to account for the
bilateral structure of tort law is thus a serious strike against it as a
descriptive theory.45
On a broader level, instrumentalism as a legal theory raises
significant concerns. If law is simply an instrument to achieve a
variety of social ends, then judges deciding cases are simply
policymakers, no different than legislators, and their legitimacy and
institutional competence to make policy is questionable. Concepts in
the law are drained of all meaning and are better seen as empty
vessels for a particular judge's policy preferences. One might say that
the collapse of law into policy is unavoidable, and transparency as to
the law's instrumentality is better than judges advancing hidden
agendas. 46 But I agree with the critics of instrumentalism who are not
willing to cede "the concept of law." 47 I agree with the "second-order"
critique of leading instrumental accounts of tort law and therefore
focus in this paper on how judging-plaintiffs law can be explained
within moral theories of tort law. 48

B. Tort Law as Individual Justice
What we are left with, then, is a return to a more traditional
account of tort law, an account that was dominant before Holmes
shaped the horizons of twentieth century tort scholars, an account of
tort law as private law or individual justice, 49 not a regulatory scheme
that one scholar famously called "public law in disguise." 50
45. Zipursky, supra note 19, at 703 ("Weinrib and Coleman ... seem to agree that the
bipolarity critique is a powerful argument that economists have never adequately met .... "). It
also fails to explain the causation requirement in tort law-that is, why all unreasonably risky
activity is not taxed, as opposed to only such activity that causes harm.
46. SMITH, supra note 42, at 24-32; Robert L Rabin, The Duty Concept in Negligence Law: A
Comment, 54 VAND. L. REV. 787, 794 (2001) ("[D]octrinal analysis is essentially static-an
organizing tool but little more--unless it is attentive to the policy concerns that channel
discretion in one direction or another.").
47. See HART, supra note 42, at 8-13 (outlining some issues that must be addressed to
develop an adequate concept of law).
48. I do not mean to suggest that instrumental theories, such as economic accounts, do not
have valuable insights to add to our understanding of tort law, particularly as a normative vision
for what tort law should aspire to achieve. But I do think they are inadequate as descriptive
accounts of tort law.
49. I use the term "individual justice" to mean justice between private parties, as opposed to
social justice.
50. Leon Green, Tort Law: Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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The leading individual justice theory for tort law is corrective
justice. 51 For corrective justice theorists, tort law is rooted in
Aristotelian notions of the obligations of one citizen to another and the
role of the state in mediating those obligations. 52
Corrective justice treats an InJUry as disturbing the
equilibrium that existed before the injury and tort law as the
mechanism for "correcting'' or restoring the normative equilibrium. 53
An injured person has had something wrongfully taken from her, and
if there is someone else with the requisite normative connection to the
harm suffered by the victim, then that person must "give back" what
he has taken through the mechanism of compensatory damages. In
this way, tort law helps achieve justice between private parties, even
if, for example, a poor person who recklessly hits Bill Gates's car is
required to pay for the damage caused. 54 The concepts and practice of
tort law both are reflective of and help constitute primary duties of
conduct (obligations to behave so as not to harm another) and
secondary duties of repair (the obligation to pay damages). Violations
of the primary duties of conduct by defendants, with the requisite
causal and other normative connection to the plaintiff, necessarily
lead to a secondary duty of repair to the plaintiff.
Corrective justice theory treats the bilateral structure of tort
law-the fact that victims sue wrongdoers, and liable defendants pay
"make whole" damages to the plaintiff-as the embodiment of the
normative principle of corrective justice. Though corrective justice
theories are generally agnostic on what precisely it means to wrong
another, the theory takes seriously the structure and practice of tort
law as helping explain what tort law is, what the practice of tort law is
doing.
With its powerful account of the normative principles embodied
in the structure and practice of tort law, corrective justice is rightfully
considered the leading moral theory of tort law. 55 Corrective justice

51. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 20, at 432·35 (1992) (comparing conceptions of corrective
justice); RIPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 2·3 ("Corrective justice, criminal law, and tort law together
set out the conditions of responsibility, the conditions under which agents appropriately bear the
costs of their choices."); WEINRIB, supra note 6, at 19 (claiming that corrective justice is essential
to conceptualizing the structure of private law coherently).
52. See WEINRIB, supra note 6, at 56·83 (explaining Aristotle's account of corrective justice).
53. Id. at 114-36.
54. This is a familiar example that helps distinguish corrective justice from distributive
justice. Corrective justice is indifferent as to the fairness of individuals' prior holdings.
55. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Unexpected Persistence of Negligence, 1980-2000, 54
VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1341 (identifying welfare economics and corrective justice as the dominant
theories of tort law). Other morality-based justice theories of tort law, based on libertarian
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has a significant advantage over instrumental and other moral
theories because it is more consistent with what judges say when they
reason about tort law. With the criticisms of instrumental accounts
appearing on a number of fronts, it is the leading descriptive theory of
tort law.
On its face, though, it is unclear how corrective justice might
explain judging-plaintiffs law, and the leading theorists have not said
much on the topic. 56 Under corrective justice theory, the secondary
duty to repair-tort liability-is wholly dependent on the breach of the
primary duty of conduct by the defendant. But in the judgingplaintiffs cases, a defendant that has breached its duty of conduct is
still not held liable. In Part III, I recast an array of disparate doctrines
as instances of a singular phenomenon-judging plaintiffs to
determine a defendant's liability-and then consider whether this
phenomenon can be explained by corrective justice.
III. JUDGING-PLAINTIFFS LAW
A look at tort law reveals several examples where plaintiffs are
denied a remedy because of their conduct, choices, or degree of harm.
These examples range across economic, dignitary, physical, and
property torts. 57
Grouping together these disparate doctrines under one
umbrella is new and, in some cases, quite contestable. But I argue
that we can and should consider them together as the law of "judging
plaintiffs." I use the term "judging" intentionally and in two ways:
One, more factual, speaks to the "assessing" part of judgingassessing a plaintiffs conduct, choices, or extent of harm. The other
refers to the normative or moral determination of whether a plaintiff
is entitled to recourse against the defendant.
My aim in this Part is threefold: (1) to recast a variety of
seemingly disparate doctrines as instantiations of a single and
pervasive phenomenon in torts that I call judging-plaintiffs law; (2) to
demonstrate that existing justifications for these doctrines are

notions, distributive justice, or social justice, fail as plausible descriptive accounts. See Goldberg,
supra note 30, at 563· 78 (describing goals of different individual-justice tort theories).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 90-91.
57. This Part is quite similar in methodology to the development of the "substantive
standing'' rule by Benjamin Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1, 15-40 (1998). I hope he considers it flattery.
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inadequate; and (3) to explore whether corrective justice can account
for this phenomenon. 58
This Part is organized hy the aspect of the plaintiff that we are
judging-her conduct, her choices, her degree of harm, and her efforts
to prevent the harm. Some of the doctrines discussed are affirmative
defenses, but many are considered part of a plaintiffs prima facie
case. In what follows, I discuss the ways in which tort law takes
account of each of these aspects across a range of doctrines and torts
in determining liability.59

A. Judging Plaintiffs' Conduct
In a series of doctrines, a plaintiffs conduct is judged in
determining whether the defendant is held liable for the plaintiffs
harm. At one level, this practice may seem intuitive, but the precise
justification for it has never been adequately articulated.
1.

Contributory Negligence6o

Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, a defendant who
foreseeably has harmed another person can demonstrate that the
plaintiffs conduct also fell below a standard of reasonable care. The
doctrine is used primarily in cases of accidental physical harm, but it
also has been applied in products liability, nuisance, and other areas. 61
Under traditional contributory negligence doctrine, such a showing
would preclude any recovery by the plaintiff. After much criticism of
this ali-or-nothing approach, most jurisdictions moved, in the 1960s
and 1970s, to a comparative negligence approach in which a
defendant's liability is reduced in proportion to the factfinder's
relative assessment of responsibility. So under a "pure" comparative
negligence scheme, if a plaintiff was deemed sixty percent responsible
for his harm, and the defendant forty percent, then the plaintiff could
recover forty percent of the total amount of damages from the
58. It is worth noting that corrective justice has little to say about the content of wrongful
behavior or wrongful loss-that is, how we ought to define the primary rules of conduct between
citizens. My argument here necessarily leaves the precise contours of wrongfulness undefined.
59. Each of these doctrines could be, and have been, the subject of separate articles; my
discussion of them here will be necessarily brief.
60. I use the term "contributory negligence" to refer to both the traditional aU-or-nothing
doctrine and the various forms of comparative negligence now in place in most jurisdictions.
61. The origin of contributory negligence in Anglo-American tort law is somewhat unclear,
although most scholars agree it made its first appearance in Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60,
103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809), where the court announced the principle as if it were wellestablished and uncontroversial.
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defendant. This move was thought to allocate responsibility more
fairly and, perhaps as a result, attention to why we judge a plaintiffs
conduct at all has been largely absent. 62
But the triumph of comparative negligence has been
overstated. A plurality of jurisdictions now follows a "modified"
comparative negligence system that bars a plaintiffs claim entirely if
the plaintiffs conduct is deemed more negligent than the defendant's,
as in the sixty-forty example above. 63 In other words, in a significant
class of cases, the complete bar of contributory negligence is alive and
well.
To make this concrete, take the case of Mikeal Preston, who
was driving a truck with his brother on I-75 in Georgia. Somewhere
near the town of Valdosta, he lost control of the vehicle, and it flipped
over and came to a stop at the median. Preston was uninjured and
went back onto the highway to collect the scattered equipment he was
delivering for his employer. In doing so, he was struck and killed by a
car driven by Clifford West. West was uninjured. 64
Preston's widow brought a wrongful death claim against West,
and the jury determined that fault lay between Preston and West at
sixty and forty percent, respectively. Under Georgia's "modified"
comparative negligence regime, because the plaintiff was judged more
negligent than the defendant, Preston's widow recovered nothing.
Assuming that Preston's estate suffered $2,000,000 worth of pecuniary
damages, a jury would have deemed the defendant to be responsible
for almost $1,000,000 worth of the plaintiffs harm, and yet in nearly
four out of five states, the plaintiff would have been precluded from
recovery. 65 Why should Preston's widow bear the entire financial
burden of this harm? The answer is not at all clear under a corrective
justice framework.
In the most sophisticated recent consideration of the
underpinnings of contributory negligence doctrine, Kenneth Simons
considered several possible justifications, including a "moral parity"
62. For a notable exception, see Kenneth Simons, The Puzzling Doctrine of Contributory
Negligence, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1693 (1995), which provides an in-depth analysis of plaintiffs
conduct-defenses, including contributory negligence.
63. Moreover, no jurisdiction has adopted the "pure" form of comparative negligence since
1980, and some jurisdictions have moved from a pure to a modified form during that time.
64. The facts of this case are described in an opinion arising from collateral litigation over
insurance coverage, U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Preston, 26 S.W.3d 145, 146 (2000).
65. Thirty-eight states follow either old-fashioned contributory negligence or some kind of
"modified" comparative negligence regime whereby if the plaintiffs negligence exceeds the
defendant's, the plaintiff recovers nothing. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
31-33 (4th ed. 2002) (describing the different types of comparative negligence and listing which
states follow each variation).
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approach (essentially that victims cannot legitimately expect more of
injurers than injurers can expect of victims66) and the notion of
forfeiture of remedy. 67 He concludes that there remain "some
surprisingly undeveloped and fertile issues for future inquiry" and
acknowledges that resolution of these issues "will depend in part on
one's substantive views about the nature and purpose of tort
liability." 68
Though appealing, the notion of moral parity seems
unsatisfying in a case like Preston's, where the victim only risks harm
to himself. It is not clear why Preston's careless risks with regard to
his own well-being ought to translate into West's being off the hook for
his wrongful conduct with respect to others. In corrective justice
terms, the normative equilibrium has been upset, and it is not clear
why it ought to stand uncorrected. Perhaps, then, Simons' alternative
idea of forfeiture of remedy has a role to play here.
2. Products Liability
A plaintiffs conduct is also judged in two kinds of product
liability claims, design defects and failure to warn. In products
liability cases brought under a design defect theory, defendants are
not held liable for harm that is a result of product misuse. 69
Sometimes, this is analyzed as a matter of proximate cause-the type
of harm was unforeseeable because the product was not used as
intended. In other cases, product misuse is considered a separate
affirmative defense, though with the advent of comparative
negligence, product misuse as a defense has largely been subsumed
into that inquiry.7o
Most frequently, a plaintiffs misuse of the product is
considered as to whether the product is defective at ail-in other
words, the defendant will argue that the product is not defective
because it was not designed to be used in the way that the plaintiff

66. Simons, supra note 62, at 1722-23.
67. Id. at 1723-25.
68. Jd.at1747.
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. h (1965) ("(The] product is not in a
defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and consumption. lf the injury results
from abnormal handling . . . or from abnormal preparation for use, . . . or from abnormal
consumption, ... the seller is not liable.").
70. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. p (1998) ("Product
misuse, modification, and alteration are forms of post-sale conduct by product users or others
that can be relevant to the determination of the issues of defect, causation, or comparative
responsibility.").
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did. 71 The widely used "Wade factors" 72 for determining design defect
under a risk-utility analysis include two factors that speak to a
plaintiffs conduct or state of mind-the fifth factor, the user's "ability
to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product," 73 and
the sixth factor, "[t]he user's anticipated awareness of the dangers
inherent in the product and their avoidability." 74 Product misuse is
relevant to defect, even in jurisdictions where contributory negligence
and assumption of risk are not permissible defenses to product
liability claims. 75
In cases brought on a failure-to-warn theory, defendants are
said to have no duty to warn of obvious dangers, 76 similar to a
formerly widespread rule in design defect law that defendants could
not be held liable for "patent defects." If taken literally to mean that a
defendant has no obligation to warn of such a danger, it is not clear
why this should be true. 77 It could be that warning about obvious
dangers dilutes the value of warnings about less obvious ones. 78 Or it
may be that in such cases the burden of warning is deemed to be too
great relative to its benefit. 79 But the doctrine traditionally has not
rested on such rationales, at least explicitly, and such inquiries could
be made on a case-by-case basis.
For example, take a recent Ninth Circuit case, Maneely v.
General Motors Corp., where the plaintiffs were thrown from the back

71. Id.
72. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825,
837-38 (1973), for a full enumeration of the seven factors in Wade's proposed risk-utility analysis
of a product's defectiveness.
73. Id. at 837.
74. I d. The sixth factor also looks in part to the adequacy of the warnings-a way of helping
determine whether defendant has satisfied its obligation and therefore whether any injury is
really the plaintiffs fault, in the lay sense of the word.
75. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 17 cmt. d (1998) ("Product
misuse, alteration, and modification have been treated by some courts as an absolute bar to
recovery and by others as a form of plaintiff fault that should be compared with that of other
parties to reduce recovery.").
76. See James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability:
The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 314 (1990) ("[M]ost courts agree that
product suppliers owe no duty to warn of open and obvious dangers .... ").
77. See id. at 297 (admitting that "the visible monetary costs of additional warnings are
typically quite low-a few pennies for a bit more paper and ink").
78. Id. at 314 ("[A]s product wamings address each new level of risk, the lists of warnings
becomes increasingly longer and consumer focus more attenuated and difficult.").
79. Indeed, under the current Restatement, this cost-benefit analysis matters explicitly in
determining whether there is a post-sale duty to warn. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 10(b) (1998) ("A reasonable person in the seller's position would provide a
warning after the time of sale if ... the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the burden of
providing a warning.").
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of a pickup truck when the truck crashed. 80 Defendants succeeded in
getting summary judgment-upheld on appeal-on the ground that
General Motors had no duty to warn of such an obvious danger. 81 But
this need not be the case. Though it is unclear from the opinion
precisely what kind of warning the plaintiffs thought should have
been given, perhaps a small sign or label on the back of the pickup, or
even something in the owner's manual, would not have been too
onerous and might have given potential passengers second thoughts.
Certainly the harm is foreseeable.
Perhaps, then, this no-liability decision can be understood as a
judgment that, in light of the obviousness of the danger, it was the
plaintiffs responsibility to avoid the harm or bear the burden of the
harm that occurred. 82 The Maneely court's statement-"Anyone
getting into the cargo area of a pickup could not fail to recognize that
it is neither designed nor equipped to transport passengers. A cargo
bed is for cargo, not people ...."83-indicates the disdain that the
judges may have felt for the plaintiffs' quest for a remedy. From the
word "anyone," we can sense the judges' conclusion that the plaintiffs
either were really careless or, more likely, must have appreciated the
risks and rode in the truck notwithstanding them. 84 My point here is
not that "no wrong by the defendant" does no work in such a case, but
that judging the plaintiffs conduct is also doing normative work that
is not easily explained within corrective justice theory.
3. Justifiable Reliance in Fraud

In common law fraud, even if one intentionally deceives
another, a defendant is only liable if the plaintiff actually and
justifiably relied on the deception. 85 To award damages, a court must

80. 108 F.3d 1176, 1178 (9th Cir. 1997).
81. ld. at 1180.
82. ld. at 1181 ("Appellants cannot meet the consumer expectations test because just as
ordinary consumers would recognize that riding in a pickup cargo bed is dangerous, they also
would not expect the pickup truck to protect passengers in the cargo bed during an accident.").
83. ld. at 1180.
84. I d. ("At some point, manufacturers must be relieved of the paternalistic responsibility of
warning users of every possible risk that could arise from foreseeable use of their product. That
point comes when ordinary users readily recognize the risk on their own."). lf the plaintiffs'
awareness of the risk is what really drives the no-liability determination, then this case might
better be seen as a species of assumption of risk in the "judging plaintiffs' choices" category. See
infra text accompanying notes 108-112.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 525 (1977); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1359
(2000). But see Margaret V. Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule lOb-5: Should
Careless Plaintiffs be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 96, 138-40 (1985) (arguing that

1766

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:6: 17 49

assess the plaintiffs conduct (in relying on the misrepresentation) and
deem it justified. But why must the reliance be justifiable?
Consider Williams u. Rank & Son Buick, Inc., where Williams
bought a used car after being told falsely that it had air-conditioning. 86
The statement was an intentional deception by the salesman, and
Williams actually relied on it. 87 Nevertheless, the court held that it
was not actionable fraud because the plaintiff could have and should
have checked the air-conditioning when taking the car for a test
drive. 88 Therefore, the court reasoned, the plaintiffs reliance was not
reasonable, and there was no liability. This kind of case is quite
common, even though black letter law says that "contributory
negligence"-the plaintiffs carelessness-is not a defense to an
intentional tort like fraud. 89
Scholars have struggled to explain this justifiable-reliance
requirement. 90 Some have considered it merely a proxy for other
elements that are essential to the tort, leaving the question of whether
the reliance was justified as superfluous. 91 Mter all, the wrongful
nature of the defendant's conduct exists in the deception-the
improper interference with a plaintiffs ability to make informed
courts were historically quite divided on the requirement of justifiable reliance, despite the
Supreme Court's characterization of it as established doctrine).
86. 170 N.W.2d 807, 808 (Wis. 1969).
87. Id. at 810.
88. Id. at 811 ("In the instant case the respondent had ample opportunity to determine
whether the car was air-conditioned. He had examined the car on the lot and had been allowed to
remove the car from the lot unaccompanied by a salesman for a period of approximately one and
one-half hours .... No great search was required to disclose the absence of the air-conditioning
unit since a mere flip of a knob was all that was necessary.").
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 481 (1965) ("The plaintiffs contributory negligence
does not bar recovery against a defendant for a harm caused by conduct of the defendant which
is wrongful because it is intended to cause harm to some legally protected interest of the plaintiff
or a third person.").
90. See John C.P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Place of
Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARlZ. L. REV. 1001, 1004 (2006) (discussing the related issue of whether the
element of actual reliance itself captures something distinctive or is merely a stand-in for
causation, and finding that there are independent justifications for the reliance requirement in
fraud).
91. Courts and commentators have also struggled with whether or not this is more
appropriately considered akin to contributory negligence, the notion captured in the phrase
"reasonable reliance" that the plaintiff acted carelessly, or closer to the notion of reckless
disregard for the truth captured in "justifiable reliance." Different jurisdictions use different
terms, some interchangeably. See DOBBS, supra note 85, at 1361 ("[T]he justified reliance
requirement seems less like a separate issue and more like evidence about the plaintiffs actual
reliance or the defendant's culpability .... Courts could, in other words, abolish the separate
requirement of justified reliance without changing the outcome of cases, only the mode of
analysis."); Andrew R. Klein, Comparative Fault and Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 983, 987 (2006)
("According to some scholars, courts do not actually view justifiable reliance as an independent
element.").
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decisions about her life and how to employ her resources. Whether
plaintiff was foolish in relying upon the misrepresentation does
affect our assessment, as a matter of morality or ethics, of
wrongful character of a defendant's conduct. 92 The purpose of
justified-reliance requirement, then, remains a bit of a puzzle.

the
not
the
the

4. Defamation and Privacy
The plaintiffs efforts to avoid harm are also judged in
defamation and privacy. In the common-law privacy tort of public
disclosure of private facts, a plaintiffs efforts to keep certain facts
private are assessed in determining liability. 93 If a plaintiff has not
taken care to keep the relevant facts of her life private, then she
cannot hold the defendant liable. 94 This is so even if she has not
consented to the public disclosure of these facts. 95 If the plaintiff has
not taken sufficient steps to protect her privacy, then she is not
entitled to complain about unwanted disclosures.
The limit on liability for "public figures" in defamation law is
also based on judging the plaintiffs ability to prevent, or even combat,
the harm. 96 To bring a defamation claim, a plaintiff who is deemed to
be a "public figure" 97 has to show "actual malice" by clear and
convincing evidence 98-an extremely difficult hurdle to overcome. This
doctrine, created by the Supreme Court as a way of protecting First
Amendment values, is based explicitly on two factors: the plaintiffs
prior activities and his capacity to rebut the defamatory statement. 99
The "prior activities" factor is a variant of assumption of risk: if the
plaintiff has thrust himself into the public domain, he has, in some
sense, assumed the risk of false and defamatory statements being
made about him.l 00 Meanwhile, the capacity to rebut the statement is
a judgment about a plaintiffs capacity for self-help, with the apparent
92. This is the case unless we are talking about puffery. See David A. Hoffman, The Best
Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395 (2006) (arguing that the puffery defense is a legitimate
concept that is unfortunately lacking uniform application).
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 652D cmt. b (1977).
94. Id. ("[T]here is no liability for giving further publicity to what the plaintiff himself
leaves open to the public eye.").
95. Jonathan B. Mintz, The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the
Private Domain, 55 MD. L. REV. 425, 440 (1996) ("[F]acts that either are public knowledge or have
already been publicizedO are not actionably private, regardless of their nature." (footnotes
omitted)).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 580A cmt. c (1977).
97. Id.
98. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
99. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
100. Id. at 345.
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assumption that if the plaintiff has the ability to respond, there is less
need for the law to provide a remedy.
5. Trade Secrets Law
In trade secrets law, information deserves legal protection as a
trade secret if (1) it has independent economic value not readily
ascertainable to others, and (2) the plaintiff took reasonable steps to
protect the secrecy of the information.IOI This second prong has been
explained in various ways: as an evidentiary requirement in a
situation where the property at issue is intangible; as circumstantial
evidence of the first prong, the independent economic value; or as an
incentive for firms to engage in self-help.I02 But the requirement
seems odd-if someone steals something of value from someone else,
why should the victim need to show that she made efforts to safeguard
it in order to recover damages from the person who stole it? One court
described it as "anomalous" for the courts to prohibit the use of
information that the "rightful owner did not undertake to protect." 103
The precise anomaly is left unexplained.
6. Possible Justifications for Judging Plaintiffs' Conduct
Corrective justice theorists have little to say about why a
plaintiffs conduct ought to matter to whether a defendant is held
liable for the plaintiffs harm.I 04 In his book on corrective justice,
Ernest Weinrib discusses the issue in a footnote, indicating that
contributory negligence is based on "transactional equality," the
notion that "the plaintiff cannot demand that the defendant should
101. This two-prong test comes from the common law and is now widely accepted. E.g., Dicks
v. Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279, 1283 (Vt. 2001). It has since been codified in the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990), which has been adopted in some form in at least 45 U.S.
jurisdictions. R. Mark Halligan, U.S. Trade Secret Protection by State, http://my.execpc.com/
-mhallign/41state.html (listing trade secret statutes and date of enactment, updated through
July 13, 2005) (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
102. See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-Help, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL'y
215, 226-30 (2005).
103. Dicks, 768 A.2d at 1284.
104. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 20, at 216 n.7 (acknowledging that he has not given
enough thought to positive defenses to liability); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT
LIABILITY 83-131 (1980) (arguing that contributory negligence should be a separate defense);
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 549 (1972)
(mentioning contributory negligence only briefly); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of
Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 499, 512-13 (1992) (arguing that corrective justice as
comparative apportionment is consistent with "outcome-responsibility"); Richard W. Wright, The
Logic and Fairness of Joint and Several Liability, 23 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 45, 75-78 (1992)
(looking at possible differences between victim and injurer negligence).
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observe a greater care than the plaintiff with respect to the plaintiffs
safety ." 105
This idea faces a few objections. First, as a matter of primary
conduct, it is not clear that the plaintiff is demanding anything of the
defendant. Rather, the plaintiff is demanding that the defendant
compensate her for the harm he caused. Second, the Kantian principle
at the root of Weinrib's theory--of not using others for one's own
projects or exercising too much autonomy at the expense of otherswould seem to carry much less, if any, force when applied to conduct
that risks harm to self as opposed to others. 106 Mikeal Preston did not
behave wrongfully towards Clifford West in this way by risking his
own life to save his employer's equipment.l 07
Indeed, the very way in which corrective-justice theorists frame
the question of tort liability-"Did the defendant wrong the
plaintiff?"-would seem to leave little conceptual space for
consideration of the plaintiffs conduct, unless the argument is that if
the plaintiff has acted carelessly, then the defendant has not wronged
the plaintiff. But this logic is weak. If we assume that the defendant's
wrongful behavior consists of insufficient attention to the risk that her
conduct will create harm for others, then that behavior is wrongful
because she was not more careful, and it is wrongful relative to the
class of persons (ostensibly including the plaintiff) for whom she
created an unreasonable risk of harm. It seems anomalous that the
wrongful character of the defendant's behavior would change
depending on what level of care each class member happens to take,
though that level of care could be relevant to liability for other
reasons.

B. Judging Plaintiffs' Choices
Unlike the doctrines just discussed, where the plaintiffs
conduct is judged, the plaintiffs choices are judged in another class of
cases. Though much of the doctrine below is generally talked about in
terms of "no wrong'' by the defendant, an explanation that fits
squarely into corrective justice theory, scholars and judges were
uncomfortable with this conclusion in many of these cases. Indeed, I
think the idea of judging a plaintiffs choices provides a more
satisfying explanation of the outcome of many of these cases. To a

105. WEINRIB, supra note 6, at 169 n.53.
106. See Simons, supra note 62, at 1713-18 (explaining why "this view of negligence as
unjustifiable egoism does not easily carry over to a victim's negligence").
107. See supra text accompanying note 64.
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certain extent, this conclusion is uncontroversial, but it is an
explanation that does not fit easily into the dominant moral theory of
tort law.
1. Assumption of Risk

In negligence law, defendants can argue that because the
plaintiff has "assumed the risk" of injury, she is not entitled to a
remedy. Under traditional "implied" assumption of risk doctrine, if the
plaintiff was aware of and voluntarily chose to encounter the risk that
resulted in harm, then the plaintiff is precluded from recovery. 108
Scholars have struggled with formulating a satisfying answer
as to what exactly is meant by "assumption of risk," with many
concluding that the defense should be eliminated entirely. As Stephen
Sugarman puts it, "[W]hen we are tempted to say 'assumption of risk,'
we should instead say something else." 109 Indeed, the draft
Restatement (Third) recommends abolishing assumption of risk and
sorting the relevant remnants into the duty, breach, and comparative
negligence inquiries.no Several jurisdictions have done just that.ln
But some form of assumption of risk, whether as a distinct doctrine or
in other guises, still holds sway in many jurisdictions.n 2
Many courts and scholars treat "assumption of risk" as
meaning that there was no wrong by the defendant when the criteria
of voluntariness and awareness are satisfied. Indeed, volenti non fit
injuria-the Latin phrase for assumption of risk-translates as "to
one who consents no wrong is done." But the logic of the phrase, in any
language, does not appear to withstand scrutiny.

108. I do not deal with explicit assumption of risk defenses because those claims are more
straightforward and are based on contract, rather than tort, principles.
109. Sugarman, supra note 18, at 835. Sugarman persuasively argues that consent to the
risk of physical harm does not logically entail consent to legal injury, or consent to bearing the
full financial burden of physical harm. I d. at 834.
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY§ 2 cmt. i (2000) (implied
assumption of risk distinguished). This Section abandons the traditional doctrine of implied,
voluntary assumption of risk embodied in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 496C-G (1965).
111. See Annotation, Effect of Adoption of Comparative Negligence Rules on Assumption of
Risk, 16 A.L.R.4th 700, § 2 (1982).
112. See Kenneth W. Simons, Reflections on Assumption of Risk, 50 UCLA L. REV. 481, 482
(2002) (pointing out that "[r]eports of the death of assumption of risk are slightly exaggerated,"
as many courts continue to recognize assumption of risk as a substantive doctrine, and also rely
implicitly on the consensual rationale behind assumption of risk in applying other doctrines).
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Take Murphy v. Steeplechase, the Cardozo opmwn where the
plaintiff injured himself on "the Flopper" ride at Coney Island. 113
Assume the amusement park defendant had known that the belt on
the Flopper machine was due to be changed but decided to delay the
upgrade for cash-flow reasons. The amusement park has committed a
moral and legal wrong towards the "vigorous young man," 114 the
plaintiff held responsible by Cardozo on an assumption-of-risk theory.
Indeed, the structure of the negligence tort itself-duty, breach,
causation, and harm (all of which were satisfied)-indicates that once
all these elements are satisfied, there is a "tort," a wrong. 115 To say
that assumption-of-risk doctrine is really an example of an innocent
defendant is in considerable tension with the structure and practice of
tort law.
Alternatively, one could describe the assumption-of-risk
defense as expressing the idea that "a plaintiff who decides to allow
his or her rights to be imperiled cannot complain when a risk
materializes." 116 So says Ernest Weinrib, one of the leading corrective
justice theorists (though again, in just a footnote). This idea sounds
promising. Perhaps we could think of assumption of risk not as an
affirmative consent to face a physical risk, but as a judgment about
what the plaintiff is entitled to expect in terms of a legal remedy . 117
The problem is that there does not appear to be any room in
Weinrib's analytic structure of tort law for such an argument to have
any normative force; that is, under Weinrib's corrective justice theory,
the violation of a primary duty of conduct gives rise to a secondary
duty of repair (to compensate), and there is not a place in the analysis
to deem certain plaintiffs ineligible for relief.
One leading scholar in this area, Kenneth Simons, has
suggested that assumption-of-risk doctrine can be seen as furthering
the value of autonomy by respecting individuals' "full preference" for

113. 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929) (finding that the risk of injury on a ride at defendant's
amusement park was foreseeable, and plaintiff therefore assumed the risk). See introductory
discussion in text accompanying supra notes 7-9.
114. Murphy, 166 N.E. at 174.
115. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1489 (6th ed. 1990). The word "tort" derives from Latin word
for "to twist."
116. WEINRIB, supra note 6, at 169 n.53.
117. The recourse theorists make this point. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Shielding Duty: How Attending to Assumption of Risk, Attractive Nuisance, and Other
"Quaint" Doctrines Can Improve Decisionmaking in Negligence Cases, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 344
(2006) ("[l]mplied assumption of risk concerns whether the plaintiff has done something that
undermines her entitlement to complain about the defendant's conduct, not whether the
defendant was under an obligation to take care to avoid injuring a person such as the plaintiff, or
whether that obligation was breached.").
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engaging in risky activities. 118 This is certainly consistent with (and
has influenced) my account of judging plaintiffs' choices. But it is not
clear, from Simons's work or the main corrective justice accounts,
what role furthering autonomy has in the normative structure of tort
law.l 19 Moreover, it seems odd to argue, at least in an individual case,
that it advances an individual's autonomy by denying her a remedy
when she suffers harm caused by another's negligence. On the other
hand, it may be that tort law should respect such choices on a
"wholesale" level by recognizing that there are categories of activities
like skiing, bungee jumping, and Flapper-riding with inherent risks
that some might prefer to face rather than not doing the activity. As
such, the tort system should not intervene if the risk results in
harm. 120
2. Consent to Intentional Torts
The issue of consent to intentional torts has long posed
conceptual and practical problems for tort scholars and practitioners.
Like assumption of risk, courts have an intuitive sense that there is a
category of cases where a plaintiffs knowledge, imputed or actual, of a
particular risk ought to preclude recovery. 121 But the use of terms such
as "consent" and "assumed the risk" quickly lead to difficult questions
about what risks can be consented to or assumed.l 22
Because of these conceptual difficulties, courts are split on
whether consent to battery, for example, is properly considered an

118. See Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory
of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REV. 213, 218-48 (1987) (presenting model of full preference).
119. It might well be consistent with Arthur Ripstein's account, based on Kant and Rawls, of
tort law reinforcing people's ability to pursue their own ends. RIPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 24-47;
Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811,
1820-29 (2004).
120. See Simons, supra note 112, at 508 (describing no-duty rules as "wholesale, categorical
rules conclusively presuming that adequately warned participants in such an activity sufficiently
consent to the risk and therefore should not obtain recovery''); Kenneth W. Simons, Murphy v.
Steeplechase Amusement Co.: While the Timorous Stay at Home, the Adventurous Ride the
Flapper, in TORTS STORIES 179, 201-02 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003)
(explaining the difference between the more "individualized and subjective" assumption of risk
approach, and the more "wholesale" no-duty approach).
121. Simons, supra note 118, at 248 (defining consent as plaintiffs "relative certainty that
the risk will materialize").
122. I am referring to implied consent here, not express consent, as the latter does not pose
such conceptual difficulties. For discussion of the difficulties in defining the proper scope of
consent doctrine, see Kenneth Simons, Book Review, The Conceptual Structure of Consent in
Criminal Law, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 577, 616-29 (2006), a review of PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC
OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL
CONDUCT (2004).
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affirmative defense or something that a plaintiff must negate as an
element of her prima facie case. 12 3 In favor of the "element" approach,
many commentators say that one who consents has not been
wronged. 124 Consistent with this view, Heidi Hurd talks about the
"moral magic of consent"-the ability of individuals to transform
wrongful behavior into acceptable behavior.l 25 But many of the cases
that most commonly lead to litigation over issues of "consent" in torts
are at odds with this view.
Take two common areas where difficult consent issues arise:
football and sex. In the context of football, the question frequently
arises whether harmful contact that is outside the rules of the game is
something that a player consents to and, therefore, precludes him
from tort recovery. In a well-known and illustrative case, Hackbart u.
Cincinnati Bengals, one player intentionally struck another in the
back of the neck with his forearm in the middle of a play out of
frustration. 126 In other words, he intentionally caused harmful contact.
By any moral definition, and by the legal definition of the tort of
battery, such behavior is wrongful. Yet, the trial court in Hackbart
denied recovery on a consent theory .127
In the context of sex, the issue tends to arise when one person
sues another for battery, after being infected with a sexually
transmitted disease ("STD"). The defendant then responds that the
plaintiff consented to the contact by agreeing to sex, while the plaintiff
argues that consent was vitiated because she did not know that the
defendant had an STD. The results in these cases have been mixed,
frequently turning on whether or not the plaintiff asked about such
diseases and was lied to (consent vitiated) or whether the defendant
simply failed to volunteer the information (not enough to vitiate
consent).1 28 Either way, the defendant was substantially certain that

123. See Jaske v. State, 539 N.E.2d 14, 17 (Ind. 1989) ('We first note that lack of consent is
not included among the statutory elements of the offense of battery."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 5 cmt. c (1965) ("The word 'defense' is not used in any technical procedural sense.
Thus in an action for battery the burden rests upon the plaintiff to prove that the contact
inflicted was without his consent.").
124. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 496A cmt. b (1965) ("(N]o wrong is done to one
who consents.").
125. Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 123 (1996).
126. 601 F.2d 516, 519 (lOth Cir. 1979).
127. Id. at 518-19.
128. See Hogan v. Tavzel, 660 So. 2d 350, 352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) ("Consent to sexual
intercourse is not the equivalent of consent to be infected with a venereal disease."); Kathleen K.
v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 997 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) ("[A] woman's consent to sexual
intercourse [is] vitiated by the man's fraudulent concealment of a risk of infection with venereal
disease."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 892B cmt. e, illus. 5 (1979) ("A consents to sexual
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harmful contact would result, fulfilling the basic tort of battery. Again,
it is difficult to say that the defendant's behavior was anything but
wrongful morally; yet if he simply failed to disclose, the plaintiff is
frequently precluded from recovery under a theory that she consented
to such risk.
In both categories (assumption of risk and consent), to say that
the defendant's behavior was not wrongful, simply because the
plaintiff was aware of and chose to risk harm, is at odds with social
norms of right and wrong. It must be, then, that the decision not to
impose liability is driven by something else-some reason why the
plaintiff cannot expect to recover from the defendant, despite having
been treated wrongfully. In my view, these cases are best read as
turning on the plaintiffs choice to play football or to have sex
unprotected; but again, the reason why such a choice ought to matter
for purposes of tort liability remains unclear.
3. Harm from Use of Land
Under common law, the standard of care owed by a landowner
in negligence claims depends on the status of the plaintiff: licensee,
invitee, or trespasser. 129 Licensees are people who enter the property
as social guests, 130 while invitees are invited for some kind of business
purpose.l 31 Historically, these categories have their roots in feudal
notions, 132 but why should they be relevant for determining the level
of care owed? Some jurisdictions, led by California, have determined
that they are not relevant and have imposed a general duty of
reasonable care for landowners.l 33 Nonetheless, many jurisdictions

intercourse with B, who knows that A is ignorant of the fact that B has a venereal disease. B is
subject to liability to A for battery.").
129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 333, 342, 343 (1965) (setting forth standards of
care owed to trespassers, licensees, and invitees).
130. Id. § 330.
131. Id. § 332.
132. E.g., Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959) ("The
distinctions which the common law draws between licensee and invitee were inherited from a
culture deeply rooted to the land, a culture which traced many of its standards to a heritage of
feudalism.").
133. The California Supreme Court stated the rationale underlying this choice:
A man's life or limb does not become less worthy of protection by the law nor a loss
less worthy of compensation under the law because he has come upon the land of
another without permission or with permission but without a business purpose.
Reasonable people do not ordinarily vary their conduct depending upon such matters,
and to focus upon the status of the injured party as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee in
order to determine the question whether the landowner has a duty of care, is contrary
to our modern social mores and humanitarian values.
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have retained the tripartite division under the common law, 134 with a
plurality abolishing the licensee-invitee distinction, but retaining the
distinction for trespassers. 135
One common explanation for the higher level of care accorded
invitees is the quid pro quo: because the defendant expects a potential
benefit from those invited for business purposes, he owes a higher
level of care for the invitee's safety. 136 But as Prosser showed many
years ago, this rationale is on weak footing. 137 It is not the potential
financial benefit at work here, but rather an implied representation of
safety made to people you invite onto your property, which applies
equally to both business and social guests, though not to trespassers.
Though many of the cases where licensees and trespassers are
denied
recovery
are
framed
in
terms
of
"no duty," this conclusion is difficult to understand if duty is a guide to
primary conduct. Mter all, many landowners have different kinds of
people coming in and out all the time. And they either have to put a
sign up that says "Watch out for the hole," or not. In most cases, this is
better understood as a judgment that the plaintiff is not entitled to
complain because of her choice, for example, to trespass.
Moreover, the Restatement (Second) and much of the case law
emphasizes the plaintiffs choices or conduct as much as the
defendant's.l 38 The Restatement speaks repeatedly about what the
plaintiff is "entitled to expect" based on her status. 139 The dividing line

Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968). By statute, California has since made an
exception for trespassers.
134. See, e.g., Nicoletti v. Westcor, Inc., 639 P.2d 330, 332 (Ariz. 1982) ("The particular duty
owed to the entrant on the land is defined by the entrant's status."); Caroff v. Liberty Lumber
Co., 369 A.2d 983, 985 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (refusing to abolish the historical
distinctions among invitees, licensees, and trespassers).
135. See, e.g., Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51-52 (Mass. 1973) (abolishing the
distinction between licensees and invitees); O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 751 (N.D. 1977)
(determining that abandonment "of the common law categories of licensee and invitee in
premises liability cases" is a matter of "judicial necessity"); Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 236
N.W.2d 1, 10 (Wis. 1975) (finding "little to commend the continued use of the categories of
licensee or invitee in respect to the liability of the occupier of the property").
136. See Fleming James, Jr., Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees
and Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605, 612·13 (1954) (describing this as "the economic benefit theory").
137. William L. Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MlNN. L. REV. 573, 585 (1942)
("[T]he duty of the occupier toward his 'invitee' was not, in its inception, a matter of a quid pro
quo for a benefit conferred .... ").
138. See Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564 (holding that a major consideration in the determination
of an occupier's liability is the forseeability of harm to the plaintiff).
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 336 cmt. f (1965) ("A trespasser who intrudes upon
the premises of another is not entitled to expect the possessor to sacrifice his own safety and that
of persons lawfully upon the land in order to secure the safety of the trespasser." (emphasis
added)); id. § 343 cmt. b ("Therefore such a licensee is entitled to expect only that he will be placed
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between actionable and nonactionable harms, then, seems to turn on
the ordinary person in the plaintiffs position, what risks she is
entitled to be warned of or protected from, and what risks she is
deemed to have consented to on entering the property. Contrary to
being about what the defendant should have done or not done, these
cases appear to turn on what the plaintiff should have expected when
choosing to enter the land.l 40
Plaintiffs' choices are also at work in the doctrine that
defendants can be held liable only for "artificial" or "non-natural" uses
of land in premises liability cases. 141 Take a recent Wisconsin case,
Louah v. Riechling, involving a twenty-five-year-old woman who sued
her parents after she fell and broke her ankle on their icy driveway. 142
upon an equal footing with the possessor himself by an adequate disclosure of any dangerous
conditions that are known to the possessor." (emphasis added)); id. § 343 cmt. d ("An invitee is
entitled to expect that the possessor will take reasonable care to ascertain the actual condition of
the premises and, having discovered it, either to make it reasonahly safe by repair or to give
warning of the actual condition and the risk involved therein." (emphasis added)).
140. For cases in which plaintiff is denied recovery because the plaintiff, given her status,
was not entitled to expect certain precautions and actions by landowner or occupant, see
Williams v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 817 F.2d 1030, 1045 (3d Cir. 1987), in which the
court distinguishes "commercial construction where the contractor and his employees expect
certain risks and are prepared to cope with them" from "a situation where the invitee is a patron
of a store, hotel, theater, or office building who is entitled to expect that the owner of the
property will have made far greater preparation to secure the safety of invitees than will have
been made by the owner of an industrial plant about to undergo alteration by the invitees";
Wriglesworth v. Doyle, 417 P.2d 999, 1000-01 (Or. 1966), in which the court holds that a land
occupier who invites a repairman onto premises has no general duty to inspect the land unless
the occupier had a reasonable belief that the land was unsafe and that the repairman, as a
business invitee, was not entitled to expect more; Stimus v. Hagstrom, 944 P.2d 1076, 1081
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997), in which the court denies recovery for injuries sustained while on the
premises to do reroofing work because the plaintiff was not entitled to expect the landowner to
warn about dangers of which the plaintiff, a business invitee, has superior knowledge.
For cases in which plaintiff is granted recovery because, given her status, she was entitled to
expect certain precautions and actions by landowner or occupant, see generally Crim v.
International Harvester Co., 646 F.2d 161, 163 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981), in which the court allows the
invitee plaintiff to recover against the landowner for not warning the invitee about risks of dust
exposure or providing protective mask because "(a]n invitee is entitled to expect that an owner or
occupier will take reasonable care to ascertain the actual condition of the premises"; Thacker v.
J. C. Penney Co., 254 F.2d 672, 677 n.8 (5th Cir. 1958), in which the court holds that a child in a
store who is injured when playing on a railing "is entitled to expect that the possessor will take
reasonable care to discover the actual condition of the premises and either make them safe or
warn him of dangerous conditions" (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965)); Sheil
v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 781 S.W.2d 778, 782 (Mo. 1989), in which the court allows recovery from
the store owner for a customer who tripped over a box in the aisle because "one entering a store,
theatre, office building, or hotel, is entitled to expect that his host will make far greater
preparations to secure the safety of his patrons than a householder will make for his social or
even his business visitors" (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 329 cmt. e (1965)).
141. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS§ 57, at 354-56 (4th ed. 1971).
142. Louah v. Riechling, No. 06-C-31-C, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47720, at *2 (W.D. Wis. July
11, 2006).
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Though the relationship between the plaintiff and defendants may be
a bit unusual, 143 this is a classic slip-and-fall case. In the motion for
summary judgment, the defendants argued that the plaintiff could not
meet her burden of demonstrating that an "artificial" accumulation of
ice caused her fall. 144 This distinction mattered under Wisconsin law
because property owners had "no duty" to clear ice or snow that
accumulated naturally.l45
Seen as a rule of primary conduct, this analysis makes little
sense. That is, property owners do have an ethical or moral duty to
clear their driveway or sidewalk of ice or snow if it is foreseeable that
people will be walking on it. Rather, this no-liability doctrine seems
better understood from the plaintiffs-choice perspective-as a
statement about the risks for which the plaintiff ought to expect to be
responsible based on the decision to go out in those conditions.
This natural-versus-artificial distinction is also critical to
liability for ultrahazardous activities. 146 Under the common law, if the
activity or use of land is non-natural, then the plaintiff could hold the
defendant liable without fault. But if the use was natural, then the
plaintiff was required to prove fault. Scholars have pointed out that
this distinction was drawn in reference to community norms about the
use of property. 147 In other words, the distinction was less about
whether something was man-made or an "act of God," and more about
143. Or not so. See, e.g., Streenz v. Streenz, 471 P.2d 282, 282 (Ariz. 1970) (allowing an
unemancipated child to bring a negligence suit against her parents for injuries from her mother's
negligent driving); Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 654 (Cal. 1971) (allowing an unemanicpated
child to bring negligence suit against his father); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A. 905, 913 (N.H. 1930)
(allowing an emancipated child to sue his father for injuries sustained while working for him);
Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366, 1368 (Okla. 1984) (allowing an unemancipated child to sue his
father for injuries received from the father's negligent driving).
144. Louah, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47720, at *7.
145. !d. at *11-12 ("In Wisconsin, it is well-established that when ice or snow accumulates on
a sidewalk abutting private property, said property owner 'owes no duty to passers-by' either to
clear said sidewalk or to scatter abrasive material thereon. However, a defendant may incur
liability for artificial accumulations. Whether an accumulation of ice constitutes a natural or an
artificial condition is a question of Jaw.").
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977). The term "non-natural" use
originated in Rylands v. Fletcher, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex.1865), rev'd, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), affd,
L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
147. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and
Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 245 (2007) (arguing that
the Rylands approach ought to apply to emerging technologies like computerized databases of
personal information); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Note, The Floodgates of Strict Liability:
Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of Fletcher v. Rylands in the Gilded Age, 110 YALE L.J.
333, 335 (2000) (arguing that the most direct and substantial cause for the Rylands decision was
a series of tragic dam failures, in contrast to assertions that socioeconomic, political, and
academic forces were the catalyst). A full discussion of the vast literature around this case is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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whether the activity was common in the community. George Fletcher
described this idea in terms of "non-reciprocal risks." 148 If the
community is one where landowners frequently use their property for
irrigation, water leakage onto a neighbor's property is not so unusual,
and therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to complain about harms
that result.
Finally, the doctrine of "coming to the nuisance" contains a
similar idea.l 49 In nuisance law, this doctrine may lead a court to deny
a remedy to a plaintiff when the defendant's activity preceded the
plaintiffs possession or use of the property.1 50 Having actual or
constructive knowledge of the activity before choosing to move there,
the plaintiff cannot be entitled to complain afterwards that the
activity interferes with her use and enjoyment of the property. As
Blackstone put it, "[i]f my neighbor makes a tan-yard, so as to annoy
and render less salubrious the air of my house or gardens, it will
furnish me with a remedy; but if he is first in possession of the air,
and I fix my habitation near him, the nuisance is of my own seeking,
and must continue."151
Though the "coming to the nuisance" common law doctrine
holds sway only in a minority of jurisdictions, 152 it has been revived by
statute in many others, 153 and its spirit lives on elsewhere in nuisance
law. Take a recent Tennessee case where the plaintiff built a house
near a stream junction, and the house was flooded by debris from the
defendant's construction of a private road on his property. 154 Though
the plaintiffs construction preceded the defendant's building of the
road, making the "coming to the nuisance" doctrine inapplicable, the
defendant argued that the plaintiffs failure to exercise reasonable
148. Fletcher, supra note 104, at 547 ("It is apparent, for example, that the uncommon,
ultrahazardous activities pinpointed in the Restatement are readily subsumed under the
rationale of nonreciprocal risk-taking .... They represent threats of harm that exceed the level of
risk to which all members of the community contribute in roughly equal shares.").
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 840D (1979).
150. Id.
151. 2 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 402-03 (16th ed.
1766), quoted in Donald Wittman, Coming to the Nuisance, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 840D cmt. b (1979) (''The rule generally accepted by
the courts is that in itself and without other factors, the 'coming to the nuisance' will not bar the
plaintiffs recovery.").
153. These are contained in "right to farm" statutes that provide immunity from nuisance
liability for agricultural operations that were established before plaintiffs acquisition of or use of
land. See, e.g., Note, Alexander A. Reinert, The Right to Farm: Hog-Tied and Nuisance-Bound,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1694, 1706-14 (1998) (giving an overview of right-to-farm statutes).
154. Manis v. Gibson, No. E2005-00007-COA-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 153, at *1-2
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2006).
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care in building his home near the stream junction ought to preclude
liability or at least reduce damages. 155 This was not a comparative
fault defense per se because the plaintiffs claim was in nuisance, not
negligence, but the Tennessee Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's application of "principles of comparative fault" in determining
liability. 156 In the context of determining nuisance liability, this
illustrates a court's assessment of the plaintiffs choices and, therefore,
what the plaintiff has a right to expect.
4. Possible Justifications for Judging Plaintiffs' Choices
I have explained how a variety of tort doctrines, commonly
construed as instances of "no wrong by the defendant," are better
described as instances where courts are making judgments about
plaintiffs' choices. But the question remains: How does this fit
conceptually within a moral theory of tort law? To answer, we must
focus on what we mean by "choices." 157
The language of many of these cases seems to indicate that the
plaintiffs choice of activity ought to mean lower expectations about
the level of care provided by the defendant. A trespasser, for example,
is not entitled to expect that the possessor of land will warn him about
dangerous conditions. The thirteen-year-old playing football is not
entitled to expect that the coach will handle him gently when
demonstrating tackling techniques. 158 And the "vigorous young man"
at Coney Island is not entitled to expect that the Flapper will have
been designed such that he will not get hurt when he falls.
But this is precisely the idea that has troubled commentators
and courts, and for two good reasons. First, the notion that people's
general duty to use reasonable care to avoid causing harm to others
might be reduced depending on something about the plaintiff seems
offensive to "modern social mores and humanitarian values." 159
Second, if the level of care varies depending on the particular plaintiff,
then these doctrines are difficult to see as primary rules of conduct
that can be followed easily.

155. Id. at *2.
156. Id. at *15 (affirming the trial judge's application of comparative fault principles).
157. I recognize the meaning of "choice" is a difficult issue in philosophy, political theory,
neuroscience, and many other disciplines (not to mention law). Here, I focus narrowly on how the
concept appears to be used in judging-plaintiffs law.
158. See Koffman v. Garnett, 574 S.E.2d 258, 262 (Va. 2003) (Kinser, J., dissenting). Even in
a friendly game of touch football, this might hold true. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696,
710-11 (1992).
159. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968).
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A different understanding of what we mean by "choices" is
consistent with the outcomes of these cases but provides a more
satisfying explanation. That is, despite language to the contrary, the
courts are not really judging a plaintiffs expectations about the level
of care provided by the defendant, or even the potential risk of harm.
Rather, these are judgments about what a plaintiff is entitled to
expect in terms of a remedy after the harm. In other words, it is not
that the trespasser is wrong to expect the possessor of land to warn of
dangerous conditions; it is that once harmed, the trespasser is not
entitled to expect the state to provide him with a right of action to
coerce the landowner into paying for the injury. Though this account
seems plausible, it has difficulty fitting into corrective justice theory.

C. Judging Plaintiffs' Degree of Harm
In another class of cases, one individual has acted wrongfully
towards another, but courts judge the plaintiffs degree of harm and
determine if it is severe enough, or reasonable enough, to warrant tort
liability.
1. Assault

The tort of assault is designed to protect the interests of
personal security and bodily integrity, and the wrong is realized when
those interests are invaded by a person intentionally causing the
apprehension of harmful or offensive contact. 160 Nonetheless, there is
a requirement in the assault tort that the apprehension be
"reasonable," at least if the defendant's act consists primarily of a
verbal threat; 161 if the apprehension is not reasonable, a defendant is
not to be held liable. In other words, the reasonableness of a plaintiffs
apprehension is judged to determine whether she receives a remedy
against this defendant.
This requirement is illustrated in Brooker v. Silverthorne, a
staple of first-year torts casebooks involving· a telephone operator in
South Carolina who was threatened by a caller. 162 The operator tried
to connect the defendant's call but failed to do so. 163 The defendant
promptly "cursed and threatened her," saying, ''You God damned
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 21 (1965).
161. Id. § 31 ("Words do not make the actor liable for assault unless together with other acts
or circumstances they put the other in reasonable apprehension of an imminent harmful or
offensive contact with his person.")162. 99 S.E. 350, 351 (S.C. 1919).
163. Id.
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woman! None of you attend to your business." 164 When the plaintiff
tried to explain that she had done the best she could, he said, ''You are
a God damned liar. If I were there, I would break your God damned
neck." 165 At that point, and for many weeks afterwards, the plaintiffs
sense of security was badly shaken, and she had trouble sleeping and
working.l 66 This seems like precisely the kind of conduct against
which the tort of assault is designed to protect.
Yet the plaintiff was denied liability on the ground that her
apprehension of imminent harmful contact was unreasonable. As the
South Carolina Supreme Court put it, "There must be just and
reasonable ground for the fear." 167 But it is not clear why this is the
case. Perhaps it is to protect the courts from a flood of trivial claims,
but that could be done by ensuring that the defendant's conduct is
sufficiently outrageous, as in the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and that the plaintiffs harm is real and severe. 168
Why assess the reasonableness, in some sense the legitimacy, of a
plaintiffs apprehension in determining a defendant's liability for
assault?
2. False Imprisonment
A similar dynamic is present in the related tort of false
imprisonment.l 69 The essence of this tort is the intentional and
unjustified confinement of another, and it protects an aspect of the
fundamental right to liberty: the ability to move freely.17° However,
being confined intentionally without justification is not enough for a
plaintiff to recover. A plaintiff must also be contemporaneously aware
of her confinement. 171

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. ("[H]er nervous system was so shocked and wrecked that she suffered and continues
to suffer in health, mind, and body on account of the abusive and threatening language
addressed to her by defendant.").
167. ld. at 352.
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 46(1) (1965) ("One who by extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such
bodily harm." (emphasis added)).
169. Id. § 35.
170. Id. § 35(1)(a)-(b).
171. Id. § 35 (1)(c) (requiring as an element of false imprisonment that the plaintiff was
"conscious of the confinement or ... harmed by it"); id. § 42 ("Under the rule stated in § 35, there
is no liability for intentionally confining another unless the person physically restrained knows
of the confinement or is harmed by it.").
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The reason for this contemporaneousness requirement is not
entirely clear. A California appellate court recently considered this
issue in some detail, noting that "there is scant authority bearing
upon this discrete issue," and "no rationale is given for the positions
taken by the various courts." 172 Prosser criticized the first Restatement
for approving of this requirement as a necessary one, 173 and the
Restatement (Second) backed off by saying that it also can be satisfied
by a showing of actual harm. 17 4 Still, Prosser was not satisfied,
arguing that even nominal damages should be enough because "the
tort is complete with even a brief restraint of the plaintiffs
freedom." 175 Many jurisdictions, however, continue to require
contemporaneous awareness of the confinement, perhaps as a proxy
for determining degree of harm, despite the California court's
conclusion that this "is not, and need not be, an essential element of
the tort." 176
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
A plaintiffs degree of harm is a critical part of an intentional
infliction of emotional distress ("liED") claim as well. In bringing a
claim for liED, a plaintiff has to prove as part of the prima facie case
that the emotional distress she suffered was severe. 177 This is a clear
example of judging a plaintiffs extent of harm in order to determine
liability. The purpose of this requirement is reasonably clear: to act as
a screening mechanism for only the most serious of claims in an area
outside tort law's core concern with physical harm. As the Restatement
puts it, "[t]he law intervenes only where the distress inflicted 1s so
severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it." 178

172. Scofield v. Critical Air Med., 45 Cal. App. 4th 990, 1003 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
173. William L. Prosser, False Imprisonment: Consciousness of Confinement, 55 COLUM. L.
REV. 847, 849-50 (1955).
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 42 cmt. h (1965) (''There may, however, be
situations in which actual harm may result from a confinement of which the plaintiff is unaware
at the time. In such a case more than the mere dignitary interest, and more than nominal
damages, are involved, and the invasion becomes sufficiently important for the law to afford
redress.").
175. Scofield, 45 Cal. App. 4th at 1004 (citing Prosser's critique of the second Restatement in
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 11 (5th ed. 1984)).
176. Id. at 1006.
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 46(1) (1965) ("One who by extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress, and if hodily harm to the other results from it, for such
hodily harm." (emphasis added)).
178. Id. § 46 cmt. j.
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But why is this requirement necessary? liED has other
screening mechanisms for trivial claims, most notably that a
defendant's conduct be outrageous, and related torts like assault and
battery do not require proof of serious harm before imposing liability.
After all, such considerations could and do come into play in
determining damages. Certainly, even if the harm is not severe, the
defendant who has acted intentionally or recklessly, and in an
outrageous manner, in order to bring about emotional harm has acted
no less wrongfully. Still, tort law denies liability hereP9
4. Possible Justifications for Judging Plaintiffs' Degree of Harm
These doctrines within the torts of assault, false imprisonment,
and liED are located in the plaintiffs prima facie case, and so we
might infer that only a certain level of harm constitutes a legal
"wrong" in torts. But it is difficult to argue that a defendant's conduct
itself is not wrongful in these cases. In corrective justice terms, these
defendants have upset the normative equilibrium by acting in a way
that is contrary to social norms of acceptable conduct; nonetheless,
this violation of the primary duty of conduct does not translate into a
secondary duty of repair. It is not clear why. Even if the equilibrium
between the two parties has not been upset considerably, there is still
a moral need to "correct" the situation and restore justice. If there are
reasons why even if such an obligation is breached, there should be no
liability, corrective justice does not seem to account for them.1 80
D. Summary
We have looked to the leading moral theory of tort law,
corrective justice, for possible justifications for judging-plaintiffs
doctrine. But the "no wrong" explanation, which would fit most easily
within the corrective justice framework, is unpersuasive, and other
explanations are no more compelling.
It is perhaps unsurprising that corrective justice has little to
say about these doctrines. First, corrective justice generally operates
at an abstract level, without much attention to individual doctrines in
tort law. Indeed, one of its leading architects, Ernest Weinrib, seems

179. To be sure, it is an empirical question whether this screening mechanism is, indeed,
necessary to keep more trivial claims out of the courts.
180. COLEMAN, supra note 20, at 216 n.7 (explaining that the problem remains unresolved).
See generally WEINRIB, supra note 6, at 56-83 (discussing the foundations and critiques of
corrective justice theory).
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to have admitted as much. 181 Second, corrective justice theory focuses
primarily on the defendant. In corrective justice theory, plaintiffs are
primarily objects of analysis, not actors. They are people to whom
relational duties are owed, and their economic and other losses can be
measured for the purpose of making them whole. But their states of
mind or conduct are not necessarily proper subjects for tort law.
Corrective justice's simplicity is one of its great strengths.
Ernest Weinrib describes the corrective justice principle this way:
"The obligation to compensate is the juridical reflex of an antecedent
obligation not to wrong." 182 But in that context, the very existence of
doctrines that judge plaintiffs as a part of determining tort liability is
a bit of a puzzle. I take the inability of corrective justice to explain
judging-plaintiffs law as a strike against it as an interpretative
theory.
IV. CIVIL RECOURSE AND THE SELF-HELP PRINCIPLE

If corrective justice cannot explain judging-plaintiffs law, is
there another way to think about it within an "individual justice"
framework for tort law? In this Part, I introduce a new and promising
challenger, civil recourse theory, and explain how it is uniquely well
positioned to explain judging-plaintiffs law and its concern with
individuals' entitlement to complain about being wronged.

A. Civil Recourse Theory
John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky are two tort theorists
who entered the corrective-justice-versus-law-and-economics debate
firmly on the side of corrective justice. But in the mid-1990s, they
began to look for ways to strengthen corrective justice's explanatory
power while retaining its notion (contra both the economists and the
legal realists) that tort law was fundamentally a matter of "private
wrongs," not a regulatory scheme or "public law in disguise." 183
181. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on
Corrective Justice, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 107, 158 (2001) ("[F]or all its theoretical
sophistication, the exploration of corrective justice by tort theorists has involved a comparatively
narrow set oflegal doctrines.").
182. Weinrib, supra note 44, at 409.
183. Compare Goldberg, supra note 30, at 571 ("[Under corrective justice theory,] the basic
features of tort law are not a mere historical byproduct, nor a convenient means of achieving
deterrence or compensation, but instead a system designed for the goal of correcting private
injustices by transferring wrongful losses to the wrongdoer who caused them."), and Zipursky,
supra note 57, at 92 ("The justice in the enforcement of private law lies in recognizing in those
who are aggrieved a right to recourse against those who wronged them. It does not lie in the
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Indeed, their critiques of corrective justice theory form the basis for
their explanatory theory of torts.
A key mistake for corrective justice, the recourse theorists say,
is assuming that the breach of a duty leads to an obligation of repair.
As the recourse theorists point out, no such "free-standing" obligation
arises-that is, once an individual has behaved tortiously, the state
does not itself undertake to repair the harms for money damages, nor
does it coerce private parties to do so.l 84 Rather, it empowers private
parties-victims and potential plaintiffs-with a right of action that
they can choose to bring in order to obtain a remedy, usually money
damages, against the tortfeasor.l 85 For the recourse theorists, this
distinction tells us something important about the normative
structure of tort law-namely, that tort law is about private (not
public) wrongs, and that by empowering plaintiffs with a right of
action, tort law also empowers plaintiffs politically, instantiating
notions of equality in liberal civil society.l 86
For the recourse theorists, the right of action (which they also
call "right to redress" or simply "recourse") is a distinct and important
concept in the structure of tort law, in addition to "rights" and
"wrongs." 18 7 Indeed, one of their primary criticisms of the corrective
justice theories is the conflation of "wrongs" and the "right to
action." 188 The structure of tort law, in other words, cannot be
explained only in terms of rights and wrongs; it must also take into
account the distinct question of a plaintiffs right to recourse.
Perhaps their most compelling critique of corrective justice
theory is its failure to explain the wide swath of cases for which
defendants are responsible for foreseeable physical harm but are not

justice of bringing about a state of affairs that is optimal from a social point of view, whether
corrective, distributive, or economic considerations provide the criteria of optimality."), with Leon
Green, Tort Law: Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 257, 269 (1960) ("[T]ort law calls for as
delicate and as profound probing as any of the other areas of law in which the public good is
more obvious. lt is thus that l conclude that tort law is public law in disguise.").
184. Zipursky, supra note 57, at 81.
185. Id.
186. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the
Right to a Law for Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 626 (2005) ("[A] society without a law
for the redress of private wrongs may be a society more prone than ours to accept ... a less
robust civil society, and a more statist conception of how government interacts with its
citizens.").
187. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 150
(2005) ("What we in fact have is a system in which the power to bring a tort action belongs to the
one who has been wronged. It is literally a legal power to force defendant to pay plaintiff, a legal
power to take from the defendant. This legal power is a right of action.").
188. See Zipursky, supra note 57, at 87-88 ("Harm per se does not entitle a plaintiff to
recourse.").
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held liable. As Zipursky puts it, "[t]he problem is that our tort law
does not, in fact, make tortfeasors liable to those who have suffered
wrongful losses for which the tortfeasors are responsible." 189 In other
words, being the agent of another's wrongful loss is necessary but not
sufficient for liability. In Zipursky's view, "what determines whether
the plaintiff is the beneficiary of liability imposition" is "substantive
standing," a rule that the tort must have the quality of "wrongfulnessrelative-to-plaintiff."190 In many cases where liability is denied for lack
of "substantive standing," the harm is perfectly foreseeable. 191
The civil recourse theorists also fault corrective justice for
focusing too much on the defendant. Rather than frame the ultimate
question as whether the defendant has wronged the plaintiff, as the
corrective justice theorists do, the recourse theorists invert the
inquiry. The ultimate question is whether "plaintiffs are entitled to act
in various ways against defendants, through the state." 192 Seen in this
light, questions about "what the defendant has done" are subsidiary to
questions about "what the plaintiff is entitled to get." 193 This inversion
is a very important advance in tort theory. However, while they look
at tort law "from the other end," 194 the recourse theorists don't quite
look at the other end-the plaintiffs and how they're judged.
Zipursky calls the concept of a "right of action" a "state-created
avenue of self-help." 195 And his invocation of self-help, given up as a
part of the social contract, brings to mind aspects of judging-plaintiffs
law. For example, the doctrines described in Section III.D.-such as
trade secrets law and the public figure doctrine in defamation lawlook to the plaintiffs efforts at self-help to avoid or remedy the harm
in order to determine the defendant's liability.

189. Zipursky, supra note 19, at 714.
190. ld.
191. ld. at 715 ("The substantive standing rules are most startling in the wide range of cases
in which the defendant commits a tort in a context in which it could have been foreseen that the
commission of this tort would injure the plaintiff. Yet courts often deny recovery in these cases
on the grounds mentioned above: The defendant's conduct was not wrongful relative to the
plaintiff.").
192. Zipursky, supra note 57, at 81, 85 ("The law solves this problem by recognizing a
privilege and creating a power in the person whose rights were violated to act against the rightsviolator through the authority of the state. In doing so, the law creates what is literally a right of
action against the rights-violator." (emphasis added)).
193. See Zipursky, supra note 19, at 733. Zipursky also describes it this way: ''The very
question of whether the defendant will be held liable is a question of whether the plaintiff is
genuinely entitled to an avenue of recourse--to an action-against the defendant." ld. at 739.
194. ld. at 733 (emphasis added).
195. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623, 632 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
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Perhaps this notion of self-help can shed light on the important
questions that remain about judging-plaintiffs law: What is it about a
plaintiff that makes her ineligible to complain? Are there other
reasons for ineligibility for a right of action besides the ones that we
have just canvassed? Why should this mean no liability for the
defendant, as opposed to a reduction in damages? And how does this
all fit within a framework for tort law that relies on some notion of
individual justice?

B. Judging-Plaintiffs Law as Self-Help Inquiry
"Self-help" is commonly defined as: "legally permissible conduct
that individuals undertake absent the compulsion of law and without
the assistance of a government official in efforts to prevent or remedy
a legal wrong." 196 In the defamation context, the idea is that a public
figure who has experienced reputational harm can remedy that legal
wrong, at least partially, through speech of her own.1 97 And so the
familiar notion in First Amendment jurisprudence-that the best cure
for speech is more speech-enters tort law by indicating that plaintiffs
who have access to such a self-help remedy (public figures) should not
be entitled to a legal remedy, given the First Amendment's disfavor for
government regulation.t9s
This same notion of a self-help remedy goes beyond areas of
tort law where the First Amendment plays a role. Indeed, my
argument in this Section is that judging-plaintiffs law can be
explained as a coherent whole with reference to this self-help
alternative. Below, I explain how it can be understood that way and
why it is a legitimate factor in considering whether to impose tort
liability.
When we think of self-help in the law, we generally think about
means of self-help that the law authorizes or condones. For example,

196. Douglas lvor Brandon et al., Self Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and Remedies in
Contemporary American Society, 37 V AND. L. REV. 845, 850 (1984); Richard A. Epstein, The
Theory and Practice of Self-Help, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL'y 1, 2 (2005) (citing the Brandon article's
definition of self-help); see also Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How
Technology Upgrades Constitutional Jurisprudence, 87 MlNN. L. REV. 743, 743 (2003) (espousing
a normative concept of self-help, that "(t]he state ought not to help those who can better help
themselves").
197. See supra Section Ill.A.4.
198. Bell, supra note 196, at 751 ("[C]ourts have found state action restricting speech based
on its content unconstitutional in cases where they have found self-help capable of generating
the same benefits.'); Lichtman, supra note 102, at 216-17 ("On countless occasions, courts have
struck down government restrictions on speech for the simple reason that self-help provides a
seemingly adequate alternative.").
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an act of violence that might normally be a battery in tort, and
aggravated assault in crime, might be considered lawful as selfdefense depending on the circumstances.
Self-help plays an important role in other ways. As we have
seen, use of self-help before the alleged wrong can be a prerequisite to
a legal remedy-in trade secrets law, for example. 199 In other areas of
the law, the existence of an adequate self-help remedy is a factor in
knocking
down
government
regulation.
First Amendment
jurisprudence is the best example of this; the existence of a self-help
remedy is a factor in that there is not a "compelling state interest" and
that there are ''less restrictive means" of achieving the same goal. 200
And the notion of self-help to prevent or remedy a legal wrong is the
backdrop for enforcing norms in pre-legal societies 201 before a more
centralized mechanism of remedying wrongs emerges through the
creation of the state.2o2
By "self-help," I refer to both the ability to prevent the harm
and the ability to remedy it without resort to legal recourse. Judgingplaintiffs law contains instantiations of both the preventive and
remedial aspects. For example, the justifiable reliance requirement
can be seen as a denial of a right of action to a plaintiff because she
could have prevented the harm from occurring by investigating or
questioning the misrepresentation. On the remedial side, the
additional hurdle for public-figure plaintiffs in defamation law can be
seen as a denial of recourse to people who can repair their reputations
without resort to the law.2o3
Far from being a historical anomaly, or just a puzzling set of
doctrines, judging-plaintiffs law has a logic that can be understood by
reference to the self-help rationale, and it is consistent with the
structure and purpose of tort law. The following will consider whether

199. See Lichtman, supra note 102, at 226 (explaining that trade secret law "denies a remedy
to any trade secret holder who has failed to exercise reasonable self-help precautions"). For an
overview of trade secret law, see id. at 225-29.
200. See Bell, supra note 196, at 745-46 ("These two aspects of strict scrutiny-the
'compelling interest' prong and the 'least restrictive means' inquiry-have provided two openings
for courts to consider self-help alternatives to state action."); Lichtman, supra note 102, at 219
("[S]elf-help ... reduces the government's overall role in regulating speech.").
201. See generally Epstein, supra note 196, at 4-18 (describing the origins of purely self-help
regimes in a state of nature).
202. See generally id. at 24-30 (describing how self-help governs in civil society); JOHN
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CML GOVERNMENT 10 (Prometheus Books 1986) (1690)
("[Without self-help,] the law of Nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world,
be in vain, if there were no body that in the state of Nature had the power to execute that law.").
203. The assumption of risk aspect of the public-figure doctrine encompasses the preventive
aspect as well.
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self-help can explain and unify the two major categories of judgingplaintiffs doctrine in tort law: conduct and choices.
First, judging plaintiffs' conduct. We saw in Part III that
corrective justice fails to explain why plaintiffs' carelessness ought to
matter. Self-help provides an answer. Contributory or comparative
negligence is an example of the law saying to the plaintiff that there
was a self-help remedy available-taking due care-and the law will
not invoke state intervention when you could have prevented the
harm yourself. 204
Recall the example of Mikeal Preston, struck and killed by a
car near Valdosta, Georgia. Because the plaintiff was judged to be
sixty percent at fault, his widow was denied liability altogether.
Corrective justice theory has trouble explaining this result because
the defendant has acted wrongfully in a way that has caused
significant harm to the plaintiff, according to the jury verdict. It
sounds like an invasion of a right leading to a duty of repair.
On the other hand, under civil recourse theory as informed by
self-help, tort law looks at this case and says that the plaintiff could
have avoided the harm altogether through self-help (taking due care),
and therefore, though the plaintiff has been wronged by the
defendant, she is not entitled to invoke the machinery of the state to
get even. 205
For another example, take securities fraud, which maps fairly
closely the common law tort of fraud. The justifiable reliance
requirement can be seen as the law saying that yes, top executives lied
about the company's future growth, and yes, you relied on their
optimistic statements and bought stock in the company. But if you had
done your homework and looked at what the analysts were saying, you
would have seen that the company's leading product was in trouble.
You could have avoided losing all that money without resorting to a
state remedy. 206 Because the state can only intervene so much, it will
not allow you to bring a tort claim when you could have avoided the
harm through self-help.
204. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2033-36 (1996) (describing how the law operates to create socially accepted norms in
dangerous activities, providing a threshold of legally expected behavior).
205. See Zipursky, supra note 19, at 755 ("To be sure, individuals exercising their rights of
action are often seeking to restore themselves, to 'get even' or to achieve corrective justice, but
the state's recognition that such individuals have a right of action must not be misinterpreted as
an embrace of corrective justice.").
206. See Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing "the
Reasonable Investor" with "the Least Sophisticated Investor" in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L.
REV. 473, 481-82 (2006) (describing the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 10-b5 requirement
that a plaintiff establish her justifiable reliance on fraud).
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The doctrines used to judge plaintiffs' choices work in similar
ways. This notion that the plaintiff could have avoided the harm
through self-help resonates in Cardozo's opinion in Murphy. 207 First,
there is the famous phrase that Cardozo uses to describe the
plaintiff-a "vigorous young man" 208-denoting someone who should
be able to take care of himself on an amusement park ride and, if not,
ought not to come crying to the courts for recourse. Then there is the
appeal to personal responsibility for one's choices: "The antics of the
clown are not the paces of the cloistered cleric .... The plaintiff was
not seeking a retreat for meditation .... The timorous may stay at
home." 209 The theme "you could have avoided this yourself' and the
tone of moral disapproval-not of the plaintiffs conduct per se, but of
the plaintiffs choice to go on the ride and then pursue a legal remedy
when he was injured-dominates the brief opinion.2 10
By indicating that the plaintiff assumed the risk, Cardozo
seems to be saying that one could have avoided the injury by not
participating in the activity. But in choosing to go on the Flapper, he
must now bear the responsibility for the harm.
The assumption-of-risk branch of the public figure doctrine in
defamation law operates in a similar way. 211 According to the law,
there was a way to avoid the harm to one's reputation. One could have
stayed out of the public eye, not "thrust [herself] into the vortex," 212
and then one would not have had people commenting on her, let alone
making false and defamatory statements. Though this logic certainly
can be-and has been-called into empirical question, the rationale
does ring of self-help and choice, of the possibility that the plaintiff
could have avoided the harm without dragging the state into the
picture.
Other doctrines that look to choices are consistent with a selfhelp rationale as well. To the trespasser who is injured on someone
else's land, tort law says: well, you could have prevented that harm by
not trespassing in the first place! 213 Similarly, the non-natural
207. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173 (1929).
208. Id. at 174.
209. Id.
210. See Simons, supra note 62, at 1722 ("Another approach, which I call the moral parity,
asserts that what victims can legitimately expect of injurers, injurers can legitimately expect of
victims. Insofar as a victim is seeking a remedy based on the injurer's deficient behavior, the
injurer has two prima facie arguments: first, that the victim should be held to a similar standard
of behavior; and second, that the victim's failure to do so should limit recovery." (emphasis
added)).
211. See supra Section III.A.4.
212. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
213. See supra Section III.B.3.
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requirement for strict liability for ultrahazardous activities draws a
boundary between activities that a plaintiff ought to expect to
encounter living in a particular community and those that are not
"natural" activities in the area.2 14 For activities that are "natural" in
this sense, a plaintiff could have avoided non-negligently caused harm
by the self-help mechanism of choosing not to live in that particular
area and cannot be heard to complain (or at least invoke the
machinery of the state on her behalf) if such harm is suffered.
I anticipate a few objections to this account. One is to the idea
that individuals should have to use self-help to protect themselves
from others' wrongful conduct or to prevent other people from being
harmed by their own wrongful conduct or that of a third party. 215 This
is the classic problem posed by the LeRoy Fibre case, where the
plaintiff may have stacked his flax too close to the railroad, 216 and its
modern counterpart, the line of seatbelt defense cases, where the
negligent defendant argues that the plaintiff would not have been
injured had she worn her seatbelt.2 17
The precise objection to my account could come from one of two
directions. First, one might say that because plaintiffs are able to
recover in many of these cases, they constitute evidence against the
self-help principle as explaining judging-plaintiffs doctrine. Second,
one could argue that if the self-help principle really is embedded in
tort law, then tort law needs to be changed.
Indeed, from a corrective-justice perspective, these "no
liability"cases seem odd. There is a negligent actor who has caused
harm to another. Why should that person not be responsible for
cleaning up the mess? As a matter of interpersonal morality, holding
that defendant liable seems sound. Perhaps, though, what is really at
work here is not a principle of interpersonal morality, but rather a
principle of political morality-an issue about when someone can call
upon the state for a legal remedy.
Seen this way, these cases are in some sense about the state's
responsibility-that the plaintiff can ask the state to hold the
defendant accountable for the speedy driving that caused her harm, or
the negligent railroad that let sparks burn the hay, because the
214. ld.
215. Heidi Hurd discusses this issue in Is it Wrong to Do Right When Others Do Wrong?: A
Critique of American Tort Law, 7 LEGAL THEORY 307 (2001). My thanks to Tom Eaton for
pushing me on this objection.
216. LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 232 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1914).
217. E.g., Connelly v. Hyundai Motor Co., 351 F.3d 535, 542-44 (1st Cir. 2003) (discussing
the admissibility of evidence of seatbelt use for purposes of establishing the comparative
negligence of the plaintiff, and citing several additional seatbelt cases).
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defendant is deemed responsible for these outcomes.2 18 On the other
hand, because Preston was more careless (sixty percent) than the
driver who hit him, he is deemed responsible for that outcome, and
cannot call on the state to hold the driver liable.2 19
Another objection is: "Wasn't the plaintiff the cheapest cost
avoider in all of these cases?" 220 Indeed, I think the cheapest-costavoider concept, broadly defined in both economic and philosophical
terms, is consistent with much of this doctrine, but its explanatory
power is inadequate. First, its relatively neutral ethos is at odds with
the moralistic language seen in many cases denying plaintiff recovery.
It is, therefore, difficult to argue that what judges are really doing in
deciding these cases is calculating the cheapest cost avoider. 221
Second, the cheapest-cost-avoider framework is designed farand has currency with respect to-accidentally caused harm, not the
"gallery of wrongs" that make up all of tort law. 222 For example,
defamation and fraud are two torts where the harm caused by the
defendant is not accidental. It seems odd analytically to ask which
party is best positioned to avoid harm when one party is affirmatively
trying to cause harm. Moreover, telling the truth is quite cheap, but
the defendants in the defamation and fraud examples discussed in
Part III were not held liable.
Finally, it is not at all clear that many of the plaintiffs in these
cases-even those involving accidental harm-are the cheapest cost
avoiders. In the products liability context, for example, the
manufacturer is generally in the best position to determine how
consumers might misuse the product and take steps to avoid any

218. 1 refer here to the notion of "outcome-responsibility," developed in the context of tort law
by Stephen Perry, building on the work of Tony Honore. See Perry, supra note 104, at 489-514
(elaborating on outcome-responsibility).
219. The concept of "responsibility" is by no means self-defining, and is the subject of great
debate in both the philosophical and legal literatures. A niore complete exploration of what we
mean by "responsibility" within the normative structure of tort law awaits future work, but 1
begin to explore this topic in Part V.
220. The concept of the cheapest cost avoider is described in CALABRESI, supra note 35, at
135-97.
221. Even a non-economic, autonomy-based version of the cheapest cost avoider concept,
such as the one put forward by John Attanasio, does not really work here. See John B. Attanasio,
The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian Approach to Products Liability, 74 VA.
L. REV. 677, 723 (1988) (positing as a formulation of aggregate autonomy: "act to protect the
individual against severe constrictions of life plans whenever such protection may be
accomplished through de minimis wealth-related interference with the life plans of some
members of society"). It seems odd to suggest that it promotes "aggregate autonomy" to allow
people to get ripped off without recourse simply because they failed to investigate.
222. Goldberg, supra note 30, at 519.
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resulting harm. 223 But plaintiff-consumers frequently are asked to
bear the burden of harm from product misuse. In a premises liability
context, a trespasser is not in a better position than the landowner to
investigate what dangers might be lurking on a particular piece of
land and what precautions are sensible to take. Though the trespasser
may well be deserving of liability for other reasons, being the cheapest
cost avoider is not one of them.224
Another possible . objection is that the self-help inquiry is
inadequate to make distinctions between plaintiffs who should or
should not recover. Arguably, self-help is always available in that one
can always choose not to engage in a particular activity and, therefore,
avoid physical and legal injury. Coase made a related point with
respect to factual causation's inability to do real normative work. 225
Everything is a but-for cause of everything else, so a pedestrian could
be considered a but-for cause of her own harm, even if the driver that
hit her recklessly ran a red light.
This objection is sound and points to the necessity of the selfhelp inquiry being a heavily normative one, not simply a factual
inquiry. But what is to guide this normative inquiry? What question is
tort law trying to answer in judging plaintiffs?
To make this concrete, let's return to Mikeal Preston. Why is it
that his widow was denied liability altogether because he was judged
to be sixty percent at fault, but if he had been judged forty-nine
percent at fault, she would have received nearly $1,000,000? Again,
because this is the result in four out of five states, 226 a descriptive
theory of tort law ought to be able to account for this distinction. I
begin to answer these questions below.
C. Why Available Self-Help Means No Right of Action

I have now explained how we can understand judging-plaintiffs
doctrine as denying liability where the plaintiff could have prevented
or remedied the legal wrong through self-help-in other words,
223. ld. at 552 ("Here the debate among economists centers on the degree to which parties
are likely to enter into such transactions with access to good information, clear understandings
of that information, a genuine will and ability to negotiate, and the like.").
224. Schwartz, supra note 23, at 1822-23. To be clear, I take no issue here with the cheapestcost-avoider concept as a normative framework for deciding certain kinds of tort cases. But that
is not my project. My project is interpretive, to look at a particular swath of tort law that is
relatively unexamined in order to see what tort law is doing, and to use this analysis to help
illuminate the theoretical debate. The cheapest-cost-avoider doctrine is not determining liability
in judging-plaintiffs law.
225. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960).
226. See supra note 65 for statistical information.
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without invoking the power and machinery of the state. The critical
question remains: Why exactly should the plaintiff be denied liability
in these circumstances?
In many areas of the law, legal self-help is one possibility, but
it is not required in order to avail oneself of the legal remedy. 227 If you
want to put up a fence to repel trespassers, you may, but if you decide
not to, and someone walks across your property, you can still take him
to court. 228 If someone pushes you across the room, you can push him
back to repel a further attack. But you can also take your lumps and
sue him for battery without a court saying, "Sorry, tough luck, you
should have pushed him back when you had the chance."
In defamation law, the answer to why the existence of a selfhelp remedy should bar liability is clear: the First Amendment's
thumb on the scale against government action. 229 But why negligence
law, products liability, fraud? The answer comes from the origin and
purpose of tort law-and this answer supports civil recourse theory as
a descriptive theory of tort law.
In Anglo-American law, tort law arose as a substitute for
individuals or clans taking revenge on one another for harm done. 230
In the early common law, crime and tort were indistinct. 231 For
''breaches of the king's peace," the king could get compensation, but
private victims could also initiate an appeal of felony, which might
result in criminal punishment and compensation to the victim. 232
Drawing primarily on Locke and Blackstone, the recourse
theorists point to the transition from the "state of nature" to the
liberal state and embrace tort law's roots as a substitute for private
vengeance. 233 As the redress theorists have explained with reference to
social contract theory, people agree to enter into a civilized legal
society with the understanding that, though they are giving the state
a monopoly on violence, there are adequate systems in place as a
substitute for remedying wrongs. 234 The substitute is the "right of
action" in tort law, according to recourse theory.
227. Lichtman, supra note 102, at 229 ("Most legal rules do not require self-help as a
precondition to formal legal process ....").
228. ld.
229. See supra Section III.A.4.
230. Brandon et a!., supra note 196, at 849 (''The judicial scheme survived despite its
apparent contravention of American wherewithal and human nature, partly because the courts
and laws provide an adequate and efficient alternative for redressing wrongs.").
231. David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76
B.U. L. REV. 59, 59 (1996).
232. ld ..
233. Goldherg, supra note 186, at 542-43.
234. Zipursky, supra note 57, at 85-86.
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But what is a right of action exactly, or, more precisely, what is
its role and function in tort law, perhaps even private law more
generally? Hart and Sacks refer to it as a species of "remedial
power." 235 Zipursky refers to a private right of action as a "privilege"
granted by the state in return for citizens giving up their right to
violent self-help, 236 and he elsewhere calls it a "state-created avenue of
self-help." 237
When the state created this alternative to vengeance, though,
it did not outlaw all self-help remedies-just the violent and therefore
socially undesirable ones. Therefore, a legal remedy should only be
provided where there is no longer a lawful means of getting even. This
stems from a basic tenet of liberal political theory: that the state
should only do what it must and not more. 238 For political authority to
be justified, it must be acting where private ordering cannot. Too
much state intervention means improper infringement on liberty,
according to this view.
Moreover, this principle of non-interventionism is consistent
with tort law. Tort law is a substitute for private vengeance in
situations where such action would be warranted. It is not a
redistribution scheme among manufacturers and consumers, as some
torts scholars have argued. When, absent tort law, a person would be
justified in "getting even" through violence or other means, that
person is entitled to a tort remedy instead. But if "getting even" is not
warranted, a tort remedy is not either, even if such a remedy would
provide compensation for serious injuries and deter future accidents.
In the context of judging-plaintiffs law, a plaintiffs capacity for
self-help does not mean, contrary to the conventional view, that she
has less of a moral claim against the defendant. The claim based on
morality or justice against the defendant stems from the wrongful
behavior-the false imprisonment, the lying about the used car's airconditioning, the reckless driving. Rather, there is no liability in such

235. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 137 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
Foundation Press 1994).
236. See Zipursky, supra note 195, at 636 (explaining that Zipursky did not mean "privilege"
in a Hohfeldian sense). For Hohfeld's use of privilege-in terms of liberty to act without
infringing on another's rights-see Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 32-33, 36-37 (1913).
237. Zipursky, supra note 195.
238. See Bell, supra note 196, at 748-49 ("[A] fundamental principle of liberal jurisprudence
[is this]: Political entities should undertake only those projects that they can accomplish more
effectively than private ones can.").
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cases because the plaintiff has no moral or political entitlement to the
state's coercive authority.239
To be sure, not all of judging-plaintiffs law can be explained
with reference to this self-help principle. For example, the category of
"not enough harm"-the severity requirement in liED, reasonableness
in assault, and contemporaneousness in false imprisonment-does not
fit within the self-help framework. Nonetheless, it can be explained by
the background principle of liberal non-interventionism, which the
self-help principle mediates in other areas of judging-plaintiffs law.
That is, these doctrines can and should be seen as limits on a
plaintiffs entitlement to recourse, even where the defendant has acted
wrongfully towards the plaintiff, on the ground that the state ought to
do only what it must, and the law is judging the plaintiff to be
insufficiently harmed to be entitled to invoke state authority.
In other words, rights of action are not to be given out like
candy on Halloween. After all, besides scarce state resources, there is
a countervailing interest at work: individuals have a security interest
in not allowing the state to take their property. 240 When the state sets
up a system of tort law, enabling plaintiffs to invoke the machinery of
the state to "get even" with those who have harmed them, the state
will only recognize those rights of action that are necessary to achieve
this goal. If plaintiffs could have prevented the legal wrong through
self-help, whether it be more careful conduct or avoiding a particular
activity, then the state will not make available a right of action. To do
otherwise would be to bring the reach of the state beyond its
legitimate bounds.
For understanding judging-plaintiffs law, then, the payoff of
civil recourse theory is its isolation of and focus on the question of a
right of action and its connection to the backdrop of self-help-a
further improvement on corrective justice theory, which stops with
"rights" and "wrongs." Put simply, tort law replaces (and makes
unlawful) certain forms of self-help (like violence) and provides a
remedy instead. But the flip side is that tort law denies a remedy in
cases where the plaintiff could have taken advantage of lawful selfhelp mechanisms. Questions about the conduct or choices of plaintiffs
are subsidiary to the question whether this plaintiff should be entitled
to a remedy against this defendant.

239. Zipursky, supra note 57, at 5.
240. John C.P. Goldberg, Rights and Wrongs, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1828, 1835 (1999).
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Seen this way, judging-plaintiffs law is neither an anachronism
nor an anomaly, as some scholars have argued. 241 Rather, judgingplaintiffs law is a legitimate and important part of the normative
structure of tort law.
V. THEORETICAL AND DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS
A. Strengthening Civil Recourse Theory
1. A Robust Right of Action

The isolation of a right of action is an important contribution to
tort theory, but in its current form, the right of action as a distinct
analytical concept is somewhat thin. To be sure, the isolation of a right
of action as an essential, structural feature of tort law is an important
step in shedding light on the law's normative underpinnings. But does
the concept of a right of action do any independent work?
The recourse theorists' answer is unclear, but it appears to be
no. Once it is established that defendant wronged the plaintiff, then
the state provides the right of action. Whether the plaintiff brings the
right of action, of course, is up to her. Once the wrong occurs, though,
the analytic inquiry is over: she is provided a means for recourse. 242
This analytic thinness has led some critics to underestimate civil
recourse theory, deeming it simply another version of corrective
justice, with the distinction of rights of action from wrongs as mere
semantics. 243
Even though the recourse theorists isolate the concept of a
right of action, they seem to fall into the same trap that Hohfeld did in

241. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 558, 604
(1985) ("The much-vaunted individualized attention to victims in practice sanctions flagrant
horizontal inequity .... " (footnote omitted)).
242. The one exception that I have been able to identify is that of assumption of risk, which
the recourse theorists appear to treat as forfeiture of remedy. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra
note 117.
243. See Alan Calnan, In Defense of the Liberal Justice Theory of Torts: A Reply to Professors
Goldberg and Zipursky, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1023, 1024-26 (1996) (referring to recourse
theorists as corrective justice "insiders"); John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 195, at 1, 55·58
(arguing that recourse theory fails by refusing to engage in "full-blooded normative
justification").
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analyzing the concept. 244 As Hart and Sacks pointed out, Hohfeld saw
a remedial right of action as simply part of the primary right violation,
or its corollary, the breach of a primary duty. 245 Similarly, the recourse
theorists treat the right of action as something provided by the state
when there is a " 'wrong' relative to the plaintiff." 246 But this ignores
many important limitations on the "remedial power" of a right of
action that are bound up with the content oftort law.
In contrast, I argue that the question whether the plaintiff has
a right of action is and should be a distinct analytic inquiry, and
viewing it that way can strengthen civil recourse theory. Indeed, it is
not notions of duty or wrongs that are relational, as the recourse
theorists argue. 247 The right of action is itself the locus for the
relational inquiry on whether the plaintiff is properly situated relative
to the defendant. 248 That is, a court ought not to evaluate whether the
defendant has wronged the particular plaintiff; the court must instead
evaluate whether the plaintiff is entitled to a remedy against this
defendant as part of the right-of-action inquiry.
There is nothing inherently flawed about locating the
relational aspects of negligence in the "wrong" category as opposed to
the "right of action" box. Put differently, I see no particular normative
superiority inherent in a right-of-action concept that has analytic
content (as I argue for below), as opposed to a right-of-action concept
that only tells us about the fundamental structure and purpose of tort
law (no small thing). Nonetheless, I argue that analyzing a right of
action in a tort claim offers theoretical benefits to civil recourse and
conceptual and practical benefits for tort doctrine and practice. 249

244. See Hohfeld, supra note 236, at 33 (positing that "a duty is the invariable correlative of
that legal relation which is most properly called a right or claim" but failing to analyze the
remedial right separately).
245. HART & SACKS, supra note 235, at 136.
246. Zipursky, supra note 57, at 8-10.
247. See Zipursky, supra note 19, at 743 (arguing that legal norms and wrongs are
relational). A full analysis of this claim awaits a subsequent paper. For now, I agree with the
thrust of Jane Stapleton's critique of the recourse theorists on relational duties and wrongs. See
Jane Stapleton, Evaluating Goldberg and Zipursky's Civil Recourse Theory, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1529, 1541-51 (2006) (describing several major objections to civil recourse theory).
248. To be sure, the recourse theorists acknowledge that a right of action is relational. But
they do not treat the concept as necessitating a separate analytic inquiry.
249. Although much of my discussion below relates to how to reconstruct and strengthen
civil-recourse theory with respect to negligence law, in Section V.B. 1 indicate the practical payoff
for other types of tort claims.
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2. Connecting the Wrong to the Harm

What analytic work would a right of action do in determining
tort liability? This Section takes a first cut at answering this question.
My basic answer is twofold: structurally, the right of action connects
the defendant's wrong to the plaintiffs harm, and conceptually, the
right of action answers the question whether this plaintiff is entitled
to a remedy against this defendant through an inquiry designed to
attribute "historic" responsibility. 250
I intend this answer to be both descriptive, a friendly
amendment to civil recourse as a positive theory of tort law, and
normative, in that embracing this understanding will bring conceptual
clarity and its practical benefits to tort law. This Section explains the
structural point, and Section V.B. begins to translate the conceptual
understanding into a practical payoff for tort doctrine and practice.
Structurally, the right of action is the normative connection
between the defendant's wrong and the plaintiffs harm. 251 The idea is
that the "recourse" of the recourse theorists' "rights, wrongs, recourse"
model ought to do a lot of the work now in the "wrongs" category,
including answering the question of self-help at the heart of judgingplaintiffs law. The basic approach is this: when a plaintiff can
demonstrate a right that was invaded by a defendant who behaved
carelessly (wrongfully), she presumptively is entitled to a right of
action.
At that point, though, the defendant can challenge the
plaintiffs entitlement to a right of action on one or more possible
grounds such as: (1) the tortious aspect of the defendant's conduct was
not a factual cause of the plaintiffs harm; (2) the harm suffered by the
plaintiff was not within the scope of the risk that made the
defendant's conduct tortious (proximate cause); and (3) the plaintiff
could have avoided or mitigated the harm with self-help Gudgingplaintiffs law). 252 All these arguments are challenges by the defendant
to the plaintiffs entitlement to a remedy based on a lack of normative
connection between the wrong and the harm, preventing the state
from attributing responsibility to the defendant.253
250. See PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY (2002) (explaining the concept
of "historic responsibility" and distinguishing it from other forms of responsibility in morality
and law).
251. Compare to discussion in supra Section Ill.B.l, describing Weinrib's analytical
structure of tort law, which does not include a normative force.
252. I would probably include duty in one of these categories, but will further develop this
idea in future work.
253. It is beyond the scope of this paper to defend or criticize these particular requirements
or more fully develop the meaning of historic responsibility. My task here is to explain how they
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The need for a normative connection between the wrong and
the harm is driven by the bilateral structure of tort law, where a
plaintiff-victim brings a lawsuit against a defendant-wrongdoer. For
the recourse theorists, the necessary normative connection, and its
explanatory power for the structure of tort law, lies in the notion of
relational wrongs. 254 I think this is unpersuasive. 25 5 In my view, the
plaintiffs entitlement to a right of action, arising presumptively from
the defendant's wrong invading the plaintiffs right, is limited by a
liberal principle of non-interventionism and a proper understanding of
the purpose of tort law as a replacement for vengeance. 256
In this context, we can properly understand the role of judgingplaintiffs law and its self-help rationale. As part of the overall inquiry
whether the defendant ought to be held liable for a plaintiffs harm,
we ask the question whether the plaintiff could have avoided the harm
through the exercise of due care or a different choice of how to pursue
her ends. If the answer to that question is yes, then there is not the
requisite normative connection between the defendant's wrong and
the harm, and so the plaintiff is not entitled to a remedy against the
defendant.
To make this claim is not to say that the defendant-say
someone who rear-ends the plaintiff while driving eighty miles per
hour in a fifty-five miles-per-hour zone-has not behaved wrongfully
towards the plaintiff, who had to brake suddenly (a but-for cause of
the outcome) because she was fiddling with the radio and not
watching the road. The defendant has behaved wrongfully towards
this plaintiff and all other drivers around who might have been
harmed by his unreasonable creation of the risk of physical harm.
Nonetheless, the plaintiff is not entitled to a right of action from the
state because of her own carelessness.
Similarly, the used car salesman who intentionally deceived
the buyer about whether there was working air-conditioning in the car
has acted wrongfully for the purposes of common law fraud. But if the
buyer was unreasonable in not testing the air-conditioning before
buying the car, he is responsible for the outcome and not entitled to a
right of action against the salesman.
The separate analytic inquiry on a right of action encompasses
more than judging-plaintiffs law. For example, in the tort of negligent
fit within the normative structure of tort law.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 190·91 (discussing Zipursky's "substantive standing"
rule as "wrongfulness-relative-to-plaintiff').
255. 1 will explain why in future work.
256. See COLEMAN, supra note 20, at 437 (describing the role of corrective justice in
sustaining societal norms and autonomous choice).
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infliction of emotional distress, jurisdictions use a variety of tests to
limit the number of such claims that can be brought. 257 In these cases,
it strains common understanding to say that no wrong has been
committed because, for example, harm to the particular plaintiff was
unforeseeable as she was not within the "zone of danger." The
defendant has been careless-the wrong-and caused emotional harm
to the plaintiff. This analysis is really about responsibility-whether,
despite the defendant's committing the wrong, the plaintiff ought not
to be entitled to a remedy against this defendant for whatever set of
policy reasons.
Zipursky's "substantive standing'' rule also belongs in this
right-of-action inquiry. Zipursky frames the substantive standing
issue as whether the plaintiff has been wronged by the defendant,
which is itself predicated on the defendant having "invaded the
plaintiffs right." 258 In defamation, for example, Zipursky describes the
"of and concerning'' requirement-that is, that the defamatory
statement by the defendant must be "of and concerning" the plaintiffas instantiating the substantive standing requirement. He points out
that this requirement applies "even if the defendant defamed
someone" and even if "the foreseeable result of this defamation was a
reputational injury to the plaintiff." 2 59 If the "of and concerning''
requirement is not met, then the defendant has not behaved
wrongfully towards the plaintiff, or correlatively, the plaintiffs right
has not been invaded by the defendant. 2 60
I see it differently. In my view, if the defendant defamed
someone, that constitutes a "wrong." If a plaintiff suffers a
reputational injury as a result, her "right" to a reputation unvarnished
by false statements has been violated. Nonetheless, she may not be
entitled to a right of action if she cannot meet the "of and concerning''
requirement. This requirement, normatively, may be a reflection of a
policy judgment not to flood the courts with defamation claims or to
avoid chilling speech. Regardless, the condition is properly thought of
as limiting remedy, not whether there is a "wrong'' in the first place.

257. See, e.g., Christina Hull Eikhoff, Note, Out with the Old: Georgia Struggles with Its
Dated Approach to the Tort of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 34 GA. L. REV. 349, 35657 (1999) (summarizing different approaches).
258. Zipursky, supra note 57, at 87-88.
259. Id. at 17.
260. Id. at 18.
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B. Judging-Plaintiffs Law in a Right-of-Action Framework
Important questions remain. As a practical matter, how would
this reconstruction of civil recourse theory translate into the practice
of tort law? Conceptually, the right of action asks the question
whether this plaintiff is entitled to a remedy against this defendant
and provides the defendant a handful of reasons for arguing that the
plaintiff is not. Here, I argue that the conception of a right-of-action
inquiry that I present above has a practical payoff for tort doctrine
and practice. And I move from the descriptive to prescriptive-that is,
I use the analysis of Parts III and IV to prescribe doctrinal shifts,
focusing on judging-plaintiffs law.
1. Understanding Traditional Defenses

Understanding contributory negligence's place in the
normative structure of tort law helps illuminate the logic of modified
comparative negligence regimes. In a modified comparative negligence
scheme, a plaintiff is prevented from recovering if she is deemed more
negligent than the defendant. The idea is that the right-of-action
inquiry asks whether the plaintiff is entitled to help from the state to
hold the defendant responsible. If the plaintiff acted more culpably
than the defendant, then she would not be entitled to "get even." This
makes normatively attractive the idea that a plaintiff should be
barred from recovering if she is more negligent than the defendant. 261
This vengeance lens also helps us see why a contributory negligence
defense is not allowed (and self-help not required) in intentional
torts. 262
The idea of a right of action with analytic content also has
implications for assumption of risk. Express assumption of risk,
properly identified as a contractual defense by the Restatement
(Third), 263 would sit comfortably in the right-of-action box. Defendant
ski resort, for example, might well have behaved wrongfully in not
clearing fallen trees from the slope and invaded the plaintiffs right to
bodily security. But the plaintiff has no right of action if he has waived

261. See Schwartz, supra note 23, at 1818 ("[T]ort law can be understood in economic terms
as supplying appropriate incentives to injurers and victims alike.").
262. See Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative Fault, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1427 (1999) (indicating that courts accept or reject comparative fault
defenses based on the defendant's status as an intentional or negligent tortfeasor); Ellen M.
Bublick, Comparative Fault to the Limits, 56 VAND. L. REV. 977, 989-90 (2003) (describing rules
that limit the availability of comparative fault defenses).
263. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (2000).
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this remedial right by contract before hitting the slopes. The plaintiff
essentially has waived the remedial right to hold the ski resort
responsible for an unfortunate outcome. This is consistent with the
treatment of express assumption of risk.
Implied assumption of risk would be retained, but only in its
core, traditional form. That is, the notion of "primary implied
assumption of risk"-that there are certain risks inherent in activities
such that defendants have no duty to take care to avoid them-would
be treated as part of the plaintiffs prima facie case, generally under
breach. 264 The "secondary assumption of risk" argument, though-that
plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly encountered the particular risk
that constitutes the defendant's negligence-would still be treated as
an affirmative defense and analytically distinct from contributory
negligence. 265 This would be an argument about the plaintiffs
entitlement to a "right of action." In making the choice to encounter
the risk (a choice that may be reasonable or unreasonable), the
argument would go, the plaintiff essentially has forfeited her right to
call upon the state to coerce the defendant into paying for any harm
that results.
2. Moving from Elements to Defenses
In other areas, the primary practical effect of my interpretive
analysis of judging-plaintiffs law and its theoretical implications
would be to move what are now elements of a plaintiffs prima facie
case to defenses. This change is more than superficial, with the burden
of proof now shifted to the defendant on several issues.
Premises liability cases, making up nearly twenty percent of
tort cases, 266 would be impacted significantly by the theoretical
structure outlined here. If the different rules governing liability to
trespassers, licensees, and invitees are properly conceived of as
assessing whether plaintiffs are entitled to a remedy, as opposed to
varying duties by defendants, then there are two practical
consequences. First, all jurisdictions should adopt California's
Rowland v. Christian rule, whereby landowners have a duty to use
264. See, e.g., Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 13 (Wash. 1992) ("To the extent
a plaintiff is injured as a result of a risk inherent in the sport, the defendant has no duty and
there is no negligence."); KEETON ET AL., supra note 175, § 68.
265. By saying that the concept is analytically distinct, I do not mean to say that it could not
be considered alongside plaintiffs negligence as part of the comparative responsibility inquiry as,
for example, New York does by statute.
266. MARIKA F. X. LITRAS ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BULLETIN: TORT TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996, at 2 (2000), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ pdf/ttvlc96.pdf.
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reasonable care to avoid causing physical harm to others through the
condition of their property, no matter the "status" of the person who
eventually is harmed. 267 This enables duty to be a plausible guide to
primary conduct for landowners. Second, landowners should have the
opportunity to raise the defense that the plaintiff was a trespasser and
therefore (unless the plaintiff is a child falling under the "attractive
nuisance" doctrine) not entitled to a remedy. The distinction between
business and social guests (invitees and licensees), though, would
become irrelevant.
In constitutional defamation law, rather than a public figure
having to prove a higher degree of culpability by the defendant in
order to hold a defendant liable, the standard for wrongdoing would
remain the same regardless of the plaintiffs status, and the defendant
would be able to bring a defense that the plaintiff could have used selfhelp (the opportunity for rebuttal or staying out of the public eye) to
avoid the harm. Despite the defamatory statements, then, there would
not be the requisite normative connection between the wrong and the
harm, and the defendant could not be held responsible for the outcome
of reputational damage.
Similarly, in the fraud claim, the plaintiff used car purchaser
would not have to prove that his reliance on the salesman's
misrepresentation about the air-conditioning was reasonable. Rather,
once the plaintiff demonstrated that the representation was false,
made with the requisite intent, and actually relied on by the plaintiff,
the burden would shift to the defendant to show that the plaintiffs
reliance was unreasonable-that if he had done his homework (selfhelp), then he would have avoided the harm. The outcome of buying a
lemon cannot be laid at the feet of the defendant, and thus, there can
be no liability.
As indicated in Part III, courts are split on whether consent to
battery is part of the prima facie case or an affirmative defense. I
explained earlier that in many cases, even if we determine that the
plaintiff has "consented" in the relevant sense, the defendant's
behavior is still wrongful. So it may not make sense to characterize a
lack of consent as an essential "element" of the wrong of battery. On
the other hand, the idea that judging plaintiffs' entitlement to a right
of action is legitimate and ought to be guided by a self-help principle
lends support to considering consent an affirmative defense-an
inquiry conceptually separate from the wrong itself, with the burden
of proof on the defendant. If the plaintiff could have avoided the harm,
she is not entitled to invoke the machinery of the state for recourse.
267. See supra Section III.B.3 for a discussion of the California rule.
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The judging-plaintiffs framework also helps untangle another
puzzle in consent doctrine. Courts are split on whether consent ought
to be judged hased on whether (a) the defendant believed that the
plaintiff had consented to the relevant contact; (b) the plaintiff
actually consented; or (c) the defendant actually and reasonably
believed that the plaintiff had consented. 268 Understanding the
consent defense as an instantiation of judging plaintiffs' right to
recourse supports framing this inquiry as about a plaintiffs state of
mind and conduct-whether actual consent was given-as opposed to
assessing the defendant's state of mind, either subjectively (actual
belief in consent) or objectively (the reasonableness of that consent).
The reason is that we are not judging whether the defendant's
conduct was wrongful-we are assuming it was-but judging whether
the plaintiff is still entitled to recourse. In the undisclosed STD
context, for example, we look at the plaintiff and, if she did not resort
to self-help in avoiding the harm by either using protection or asking
about sexual history, then we deem her to have consented to the risk
of infection and preclude her recovery.
The right-of-action inquiry ought to be decided by judges for
two reasons-one conceptual, the other pragmatic. Conceptually, the
right to a remedy is a kind of categorical determination best made by
judges. To be sure, it frequently will be fact intensive and often case
specific. But the factual inquiry is simply a guide to a classic legal
question: Should the plaintiff be entitled to a remedy? From a
pragmatic perspective, much of judging-plaintiffs law appears to be
driven by the desire of judges to keep cases from juries and out of the
courts. 269 Any proposal for refining tort law must take this impulse
into account in order to have any practical chance of success.
Take the example of self-help as a principle in deciding
assumption-of-risk cases. It discards the legal fiction of a state-of-mind
inquiry into what the plaintiff has or has not consented to and makes
it an objective test about what individuals like the plaintiff could do to
avoid the harm-i.e., what self-help remedies are available. This kind
of objective inquiry into available self-help alternatives can and should
be decided by judges, including on motions for summary judgment,
allowing courts to prevent some of these cases from going to trial. 270
268. The last is the most common. See generally DOBBS, supra note 85, at 534-49.
269. Peter H. Schuck, Judicial Avoidance of Juries in Mass Tort Litigation, 48 DEPAUL L.
REV. 479, 487 (1998).
270. Careful scrutiny of these judicial decisions must be undertaken given the adverse effect
such judgments have on disadvantaged groups. Specific and corroborated incidences of judicial
bias in courts throughout the country are well-documented. See Martha Chamallas, Questioning
the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional
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Indeed, that is precisely one of the key rationales behind
judging-plaintiffs doctrine, properly understood with the self-help
rationale: victims who had access to self-help remedies would not be
entitled to invoke the expensive and cumbersome machinery of the
state. Allowing these cases to go to juries would undermine that
rationale.
3. Towards a New Doctrinal Framework for Negligence Law
One possible objection to this reconstruction of civil recourse
theory goes something like this: "Wait a second. Wouldn't your theory
imply changing the duty-breach-causation-harm-plus affirmativedefenses construct we use to determine tort liability?" My basic
response is "yes." Below I elr.borate, explaining why this
deconstruction and reconstruction of basic black letter negligence law
is worth the candle.
First, let's be clear-eyed about the current disarray that is
negligence law. First-year tort professors like me are familiar with the
experience of trying to explain to students how concepts like duty and
proximate cause both work analytically and hang together
conceptually, before (at some point) admitting that they do neither.
A quick look at the activities surrounding the drafting of the
Restatement (Third)'s Liability for Physical Harm reveals the doctrinal
disarray. 271 The first draft of the duty section suggested that duty
rarely should be an issue in negligence cases. 272 This is consistent with
the progressive view that duty is used by judges to take cases from
juries on unarticulated, or simply regressive, policy grounds. 273 The
recourse theorists responded with a typically thoughtful and forceful
article arguing for a strengthened role for duty in negligence law. 274
Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 87 (1994) (examining judicial neutrality and relevance of
race-based economic data in calculating damage awards); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges:
Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 102
(1997) (finding that race bias is a common feature within state court systems); Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1621 (1985) ("Both black
and white judges convicted black defendants more often than white defendants .... ").
271. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LlAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (Proposed Final Draft No.
1, 2005).
272. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES§§ 3, 6 (Discussion Draft, 1999).
273. See Dylan Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing "Duty," 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 265, 267-73
(2006) (picking up this critique of more recent California decisions); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra
note 117, at 331 ("Esper and Keating decry the excessive eagerness of contemporary California
appellate judges to circumvent juries and issue matter-of-law rulings for defendants.").
274. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the
Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 724-32 (2001) (explaining the benefits of a
robust conception of duty for negligence law).
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But the Restatement drafters stuck to their guns and rejected the
recourse theorists' suggestion. 275 Still, the place of duty is highly
contested.
On proximate cause, the Restatement drafters think so little of
the term, if not the concept, that they title the relevant section, "Scope
of Liability (Proximate Cause)." They also propose limiting the
doctrine's scope and relevance and articulate the fervent hope that the
term "proximate cause" will be unnecessary by the time the
Restatement (Fourth) is published. 27 6 Relating to both duty and
proximate cause (and breach) is the role of "foreseeability" in
negligence law, and one scholar demonstrates the academy's
ambivalence toward this concept with companion articles entitled
"Purging Foreseeability" 277 and "Reconstructing Foreseeability." 27 B
Full development of a new doctrinal framework for negligence
law-explicitly centered on "rights, wrongs, and recourse"-is beyond
the scope of this paper. For now, I hope to have persuaded the reader
that the time is right for such a framework and that separating the
question of wrongs from recourse and treating the right of action as an
umbrella for a series of conceptual inquiries about the plaintiffs
entitlement to a remedy has the potential both to help clarify tort
doctrine and to illuminate the overall purpose of tort law. Such a
framework would be different than that offered by corrective justice
and would modify but build upon civil recourse theory.

VI. CONCLUSION
With the inadequacy of instrumental theories as accounts of
tort law and the limits of corrective justice in explaining various tort
doctrines, including judging-plaintiffs law, there is room for a new
descriptive theory of tort law to help us understand what tort law is
doing and, indeed, what we are reforming. In this Article, I have used

275. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM§ 7 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 2005) (recommending that "no-duty" determinations occur only in "exceptional cases"); id.
at § 7 cmt. a (arguing that this position is consistent with the approach taken in "almost every
torts treatise and casebook").
276. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM, Scope Note cb. 6 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
277. W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 790-94, 799-802
(2005) (supporting the proposed Restatement (ThirdJs § 7 for its purging of foreseeability
considerations from the "duty" element, in part because foreseeability is better decided by the
jury under the rubric of breach and proximate cause).
278. W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L. REV. 921, 924 (2005)
(arguing that foreseeability "might fit wholly and seamlessly within the elements of breach and
proximate cause").

1808

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:6:1749

the disparate doctrines that I recast as "judging-plaintiffs law" to help
inform the theoretical debate, but in a way that provides a doctrinal
and practical payoff. Civil recourse theory's ability to explain judgingplaintiffs law in a way that other theories cannot constitutes strong
evidence for civil recourse theory as an interpretive account. But I
think that the recourse theorists' notion of relational wrongs is both
misguided and not essential to the theory's success. In my view, we
can use recourse theory's isolation of the right of action to create a
new doctrinal framework that uses the right of action to do important
analytic work-work currently being done in the "wrongs" category.
The corrective justice theorists are right. Tort law is about
individual morality and the obligations of one citizen to another. But it
is also about political morality, the obligations of the state to its
citizens, and the limits of citizens' claims on the coercive power of the
state. When we judge plaintiffs by reference to a principle of self-help,
we help to define the contours of the obligations of the state to its
citizens. Borrowing from Cardozo, "the timorous" need not stay at
home, but they cannot then call upon the state to help clean up the
mess if things go wrong when riding the Flapper.

